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ABSTRACT 
Since China and South Korea established diplomatic ties in 1992, hundreds of thousands of 
ethnic Korean Chinese have migrated to South Korea for work or marriage.  Their ethnic return 
migration has not gone smoothly; despite their perception of a common Korean identity, the 
populations have adapted and evolved differently in over sixty years of separation.  Contested 
definitions of Korean identity resulted.  Employing a cultural political economy framework, this 
thesis explores the complex situation of the Korean Chinese within the Chinese state, their 
shifting position in South Korean immigration policy, and their eventual reorientation away from 
South Korea.  The problems experienced by the migrant and host populations grew from a 
misconceived notion of ethnicity as simply shared racial and cultural background.  In fact 
ethnicity is the complex, variable, and manipulable result of long histories experienced in 
specific places. Understanding ethnic identity requires consideration of territorially-defined 
group membership and state-sponsored attempts to claim space.  Specifically addressing 
minority groups in China, but relevant to all multinational states, I argue for a contextualized 
approach to examining changes and conflicts in group identities. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 On January 7, 2008, a warehouse owned by the company Korea 2000 caught fire in the 
South Korean city of Icheon, killing 40 workers and sparking a nation-wide debate about the 
treatment of foreign labor in South Korean industry.  Seventeen of the dead were foreign workers; 
fifteen were ethnically Korean Chinese, and two were Uzbeks.  Public outcry centered on the 
fifteen Korean Chinese workers.  These people were the ethnic brethren of the South Koreans, 
yet they were relegated to the least desirable jobs and the worst working conditions, left to perish 
in unsafe cold-storage warehouse explosions, denied even the basic ventilation system that could 
have expelled the combustible fumes.  Newspapers were filled with testimonials by friends and 
family, mourning the victims and shaming the nation that had allowed the abuse of its own 
ethnic population. 
 Was this South Korea‟s own Triangle Shirtwaist fire?  Would it prompt drastic reform in 
labor safety standards, increasing oversight and finally putting workers‟ well-being before profit 
margins?  The short answer is no.  Within a week the clamor had faded, in two weeks it was 
gone.  No legislation was proposed.  Callous, I thought.  But the repercussions of the fire did 
inspire me to question my own understanding of ethnic identity, eventually spurring me to this 
thesis.  At the time of the fire I was teaching English at Chungnam Internet High School, a vo-
tech school offering programming and graphic design classes to students in the greater Nonsan 
area of Chungcheongnam-do, South Korea.  It was not glamorous.  My bus stop is pictured 
below (see Figure 1). 
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   Figure 1: Bus stop 
 
 Nonsan is a rural town, agricultural with no industry to speak of.  No Korean Chinese 
people lived there.  Yet I was struck by the vehemence of the debate over the Korean Chinese, in 
the newspapers, with my students, and among teachers.  The blood connection between the 
South Koreans and the Korean Chinese made those fifteen workers matter in a way that the two 
Uzbeks and even the twenty-three South Koreans did not.  Uzbeks were foreigners, to whom the 
South Koreans had no obligation, and the South Koreans could have (should have?) looked after 
themselves.  But the Korean Chinese were the unfortunate kin of the South Koreans.  They were 
victims of geography and history and foreign meddling, cut off from the homeland by the 
redrawing of borders in the mid-twentieth century and left to the mercy of Chinese communists 
since then.  South Korea had a duty to the Korean Chinese, and it apparently consisted of 
offering them low-wage jobs that didn‟t kill them.  South Korea had failed. 
 
 Americans steeped in an ongoing celebration of individuality tend to believe that descent 
should not matter.  Phenotype and bloodlines are the stuff of racial discrimination.  But in South 
Korea, descent overtly matters.  South Koreans can trace their family trees back for hundreds of 
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years.  Three surnames (Kim, Lee, and Park) account for roughly fifty percent of the population, 
mirroring a belief that there are only three original branches of the Korean nation.  Within these 
three surnames though there are thousands of clans, and asking a South Korean about “which 
Lee clan” he or she belongs to can be a very long lesson in lineage.  South Koreans know their 
bloodlines, and this colors their understanding of the Korean nation as a pure descent-based 
group.  The relative isolation of the Korean peninsula has certainly encouraged this belief in 
Korean homogeneity.  But the re-introduction of the Korean Chinese to the South Korean 
population has problematized this descent-based understanding of the Korean nation. 
 The Korean Chinese do not live so far away from the South Koreans.  Indeed, ignoring 
political boundaries, the Korean Chinese, North Korean, and South Korean people would still 
constitute one contiguous ethnic group.  None of these groups have out-married in any 
significant numbers; all retain Korean as their primary language; in dress, food, naming, and 
family patterns they all follow Korean tradition.  But we cannot ignore political boundaries.  
Political boundaries now order the world, assigning every person to a state and a particular 
citizen-group.  Descent-based group identities of course still matter, but compete with place-
based definitions of group membership.  It is into this fraught battle that I wade. 
 I began this thesis with two theoretical questions.  First, how do people understand and 
enact personal identities with conflicting components?  Ethnic and civic loyalties can make very 
different demands on people.  The phenomenon of the hyphenated identity is by no means 
unique to the Korean Chinese, of course
1
.  However, I believe this case is complicated by 
aggressive state intervention on behalf of both the ethnic Korean and the civic Chinese identities.  
                                                 
1
 While I choose not to actually hyphenate Korean Chinese, it is functionally the same as Korean-Chinese, in that 
they are both compound nouns.  The first term adjectively describes the ethnic heritage and the second term denotes 
political citizenship.  I will use this system consistently throughout the thesis when discussing dual-identity 
individuals.   
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This leads me to my second framing question; what is the role of the state apparatus in affecting 
personal and group identity?   The ability to define borders is not necessarily the ability to claim 
sovereignty over populations, but attempts often go hand-in-hand.  I did not expect to produce 
absolutely conclusive answers to these questions in the course of this writing, and have met that 
non-expectation.  Still, I believe I have made fruitful headway in understanding some possible 
approaches.  In the process, too, I have addressed three smaller questions specific to the Korean 
Chinese.  First, how their tumultuous early history and tenuous claim to Chinese land continues 
to affect them; next, how they are differently understood in and through Chinese minority policy; 
and finally, how South Korean conceptions of hierarchical nationhood are imposed on the 
Korean Chinese through preferential immigration law. 
 I also began this thesis with a few assumptions.  Perhaps most importantly, I assume that 
descent-groups are rarely if ever truly descent-based.  Rather I think descent-groups are belief-
based.  As I address in Chapter 1, membership in an ethnic group does not clearly rest on either 
racial or cultural characteristics.  Instead there is a shifting weight assigned to different 
characteristics at different times, and by different assigners.  The boundaries between supposedly 
descent-based groups are easily blurred.  This leaves racial categories unreliable but interesting, 
and implies a certain fluidity in categories often perceived as rigid.  I also assume that reality has 
an ontological or material basis.  Understandings of identity do not randomly attach themselves 
to individuals; individuals develop identities based on the material experiences of their lives.  
Changes in material experience then allows for the possibility of changing identities, and every 
material experience results from a long history of human works, be they political, economic, or 
cultural.   
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 The Korean Chinese then are not Korean because of a biological relationship that literally 
stems from the shared genetic material of an actually-existing Korean originator.  If they are 
Korean – and I hope to raise doubts about this – then their Koreanness is not a natural fact.  
Similarly, their possession of Chinese passports marks them as Chinese but does not explain why 
or how they became so.  I do not wish to imply that these categories hold no meaning.  They 
clearly bear on most aspects of daily life – the Korean Chinese speak the Korean language, they 
are subject to Chinese laws, they eat kimchi with breakfast, they pay with yuan.  Instead I want 
to ask how these categories arose and why the people now identified as Korean Chinese are 
called so, through what historical and cultural processes do these categories come to hold 
salience, and particularly how is this a spatial question.   
 I will argue that while understandings of ethnic nationhood are explicitly descent-based, 
they are implicitly spatial.  Korean people can only be truly Korean by existing within Korean 
space.  Thus the Korean Chinese, in fact having a historical, cultural, and genetic claim to 
membership in the Korean nation, are nonetheless denied parity with peninsular Koreans.  
Territorially-based group membership thus trumps descent.  The Chinese state would agree.  As I 
hope to demonstrate, the Chinese state has put tremendous effort into convincing people of this.  
I was much inspired in this argument by Shelley Rigger‟s chapter “Voices of Manchu Identity, 
1635 – 1935,” published in Stevan Harrell‟s 1995 book Cultural Encounters on China’s Ethnic 
Frontiers.  I address this further in Chapter 2, but briefly here.  Rigger argues that the people 
known as Manchu were given that name by the Han Chinese upon the two groups‟ encounter in 
Chinese space.  Outside of Chinese space, „Manchu‟ did not and would not have existed as any 
kind of meaningful mark.  It is therefore a geographic identity.  Why then was it used as an 
ethnic marker in China?  I argue this is because simple territorially-defined identities can be lost 
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upon leaving the territory.  The Chinese state stakes a claim on those people living within its 
spatial authority, and has no wish to relinquish that claim just because people move.  
Naturalizing this territorial identity required a purposeful conflating of geography and ethnicity. 
 The Korean Chinese are a unique case in China.  It would be difficult to argue that the 
Chinese state began with an intentional colonizing project among them, and I will not try.  
Instead the Korean Chinese are the originally-unintended subjects of Chinese minority policy.  
That policy was designed for restive and potentially independently-minded minority groups who 
might have some grounds for a claim to statehood.  The Korean Chinese did not contest Chinese 
state sovereignty.  They generally acknowledged that they were recent arrivals onto Chinese land 
and were happy to be there.  This has changed though with shifts in the global balance of power.  
The rise of South Korea in the late twentieth century reminded the Korean Chinese of their dual 
identity.  Geographically uneven economies and diplomatic maneuvering allowed large numbers 
of Korean Chinese to migrate to South Korea for work or marriage.  Indeed South Korea created 
an entire legal framework for incorporating ethnic Koreans of disparate geographic origin into 
the South Korean state.  Did this result in the re-ethnicization and de-territorialization of the 
Korean nation?   
I say no.  In fact, the effect has been quite the opposite, leaving migrants and hosts alike 
disillusioned with their belief in a culturally-homogenous transnational Korean nation.  Ethnic 
return migration has made the Korean Chinese reconceive themselves as not essentially Korean.  
Their identity, like the Manchus', was not born into them as a genetic legacy.  It came to exist 
and can only exist within the context and the geographic space of China.  It is not a Han Chinese 
identity, but a Chinese identity nonetheless.   
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 I arrived at this argument through eight months of reading articles, books, and 
newspapers, two months of correspondence with other researchers, two months of interviewing 
Korean Chinese migrants in Seoul, four months of re-reading and analyzing transcripts, and a 
final two months of writing.  Initially, the marriage migration of Korean Chinese women seemed 
the most interesting and problematic aspect of Korean Chinese ethnic return migration.  
Prompted by gender-skewed birthrates and a resulting shortage of women in South Korea, the 
immigration of Korean Chinese women rested on the assumption that they would be a perfect 
substitute for domestic reproductive labor.  The populations‟ shared Koreanness – 
conceptualized uncritically as both racial and cultural characteristics – was thought to trump 
politically-defined citizenship.  But ensuing media reports and academic literature revealed the 
problematic results of such assumptions, which played out on the intimate scales of the home and 
body.  Domestic violence, discrimination against immigrant women and their children, failed 
marriages and allegations of fraud came to characterize the public understanding of Korean 
Chinese marriage migration (Freeman 2005, H.K. Lee 2008, Kendall 1996).  Yet research was 
dominated by South Korean opinions; Caren Freeman‟s 2005 article was the only instance of 
Korean Chinese women being interviewed for their perspectives.  I hoped, then, to give greater 
voice to Korean Chinese women. 
 A number of media reports mentioned support groups formed by or for Korean Chinese 
marriage migrants as resources for migrant women (Chosun Ilbo 2007, Hankyoreh 2009, H.J. 
Kim 2011).  In addition, I contacted Caren Freeman, a woman who wrote her Ph.D. dissertation 
on the routes of Korean Chinese marriage migration.  She advised me to find South Korean 
international marriage agencies, who would hopefully introduce me to their successful matches, 
and from there use snowball sampling to meet other migrant women.  In Dr. Freeman‟s case, 
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these women had then introduced her to social support groups for Korean Chinese women, 
which I also hoped for.  Unfortunately, soon after I got to Seoul, a Vietnamese marriage migrant 
was brutally murdered by her South Korean husband; they had been married just a week prior, 
and it turned out that the man had severe mental problems.  The Vietnamese government was 
accusing the South Korean government of lax regulation, and the South Korean government 
quickly began a crackdown on international marriage agencies (Chosun Ilbo 2010c).  When I 
arrived asking for interviews, the marriage agencies proved unwilling to do more than assure me 
of their legitimacy.   
 Instead I opted for a participant-observation style of ethnography, spending afternoons 
studying Korean in coffee shops in the Korean Chinese neighborhood of Daerim-dong and 
chatting with the baristas and waitresses whenever possible.  I also interviewed three employees 
at the publicly-funded Yeoungdeungpo-gu Multicultural Village Center (족영등포구 
다문화빌리지 센터), established to provide services to long-term foreign residents in that 
district; one researcher at the privately-funded Korean Migration and Diaspora Research Institute 
(사이주 동포 정책연구소), which published policy recommendations on immigration issues as 
well as offering legal services to ethnically Korean immigrants; two pastors at the Ansan Migrant 
Center (안산이주민센터, affiliated with the 다문화교회, Multicultural Church) which provides 
health and childcare services to the children of immigrants; and most helpfully, a legal aid officer 
at the privately-funded National Association of Returned Koreans (귀한 동포 연합 총희).  This 
National Association was founded by the first wave of Korean-Chinese return migrants, who 
arrived in the early 1990s.  It remains funded and run through subscription service by ethnic 
Koreans born overseas, mostly Korean Chinese.  Because of its large membership and diverse 
activities (legal aid, education services, job training, healthcare), it is viewed as an authoritative 
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representative of the Korean Chinese population in Seoul, and serves as a legal advisor to the 
South Korean National Assembly on co-ethnic immigration policy. 
 Ultimately I ended up with nine formal interviews, five with South Koreans and four with 
Korean Chinese return migrants. Through the course of these interviews, and in casual 
conversation with people, I found that I was hearing two very different stories.  The South 
Koreans overwhelmingly complained about Korean Chinese being old-fashioned and doing 
particular things that the South Koreans found “Chinese”.  They seemed baffled and frustrated 
that these ostensibly Korean people were somehow not living up to their name.  One South 
Korean government official, giving me a sympathetic explanation, said “They identify with 
South Korea, but they are foreigners here.  […] They do not build connections with the local 
community.  Most of them do not even own their homes, they only rent” (personal interview, 
July 13, 2010).  The Korean Chinese, on the other hand, seemed frustrated by their cold 
reception, saw the South Koreans as unwelcoming and prejudiced against them, and attributed 
this behavior to the Western influence in South Korea, because true Koreans would treat each 
other with proper respect.   
 Probing this difference led me to my two framing questions.  First, how do individuals 
and groups deal with conflicting sources of identity?  These populations shared a Korean ethnic 
identity but each had other identities as well, which the other group seemed to take as 
irreconcilable with a Korean identity.  South Koreans saw a politically Chinese identity as 
incompatible with a Korean ethnic identity, and Korean Chinese saw a Western-inspired 
individualistic competitive capitalism as directly at odds with Korean values.  I wanted to 
investigate how they negotiated this difference when they were brought together in the same 
space through ethnic return migration. 
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 Second, growing from the first question, I wanted to look specifically at the state‟s role in 
identity formation.  South Korea and China both have unique and tumultuous political histories; 
and their extreme political divergence seemed like an important issue.  Both states themselves 
emerged at the same time the Korean population was divided; in trying to establish themselves as 
legitimate authorities, they needed to shore up their credentials as representatives of the people 
on their land.  I imagined that both states would try their hardest to align the people‟s identity 
with the state, and I was curious if this really happened and if so, how. 
 But these two framing questions are broad enough to apply to most people in most places.  
To address them specifically in the experience of the Korean Chinese, I narrowed in on three 
more specific, and answerable, questions.  First, I wanted to excavate how the early history of the 
Korean Chinese, their group formation fleeing famine, colonization, and war, continues to affect 
their position within China.  Second, how they are viewed and treated by the Chinese state, vis-à-
vis China‟s minority policies.  Last, how South Korean conceptions of hierarchical nationhood 
get acted out through immigration policy, and how that affects the Korean Chinese. 
 
The remaining chapters of this thesis then aim to explore how this came about and to 
suggest how this might inform future study.  I will begin with a theoretical discussion of ethnic 
return migration, explaining why and how a cultural political economy framework best informs 
academic approaches.  I then address the role and impacts of Chinese minority policy on ethnic 
groups as a whole and on the Korean Chinese specifically.  The third chapter examines the South 
Korean state‟s attempts to manage its ethnic diaspora, and the results as felt by Korean Chinese 
labor migrants.  Extending the discussion beyond legislative and labor relations, in the fourth 
chapter I consider how marriage migration as a much more direct connection between Korean 
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co-ethnics has in fact exacerbated divisions.  In my conclusion I return to the questions raised 
here, and end by raising more. 
The fifteen Korean Chinese who perished in the Korea 2000 warehouse fire were 
uniquely mourned because South Koreans didn‟t know how to mourn them.  Korean Chinese 
were expected to fit neatly into the same category as the South Koreans themselves.  South 
Koreans could then put on their white funeral garb, hold a banquet, collect envelopes of money 
for the families of the dead, and rest assured that they had acted properly.  But the unsettling 
process of ethnic return migration had shaken their understanding of propriety.  Korean Chinese 
were not foreigners, and so deserved special recognition in death.  But neither were they Korean.  
Liminal beings, the Korean Chinese are pushing the boundaries of both descent- and place-based 
identities, engaging in new practices, evolving new understandings of territoriality, and 
ultimately creating new forms of identity that traverse traditional ethno-political definitions.   
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CHAPTER 1:  
A Theoretical Approach to Understanding Ethnic Return Migration  
1.1  Ethnic Return Migration 
 Ethnic return migration refers to the migration of people out of their country of 
citizenship and into a country of ancestral heritage.  Ethnic return migration stems from a diverse 
range of causes, for economic, political and nationalistic reasons.  This process has occurred 
among diverse groups of people around the world, perhaps most visibly in the Jewish diaspora‟s 
return migration to Israel, but also among Germans at the end of the Second World War, Eastern 
Europeans at the end of Cold War, and Japanese peoples during Japan‟s booming 1980s and 
90s.
2
  While ethnic return migration is a relatively small subset in international migration studies 
overall, it raises important issues of ethnic identity, belongingness, and the power to define the 
nation. 
 Like many forms of migrations, ethnic return migration is often motivated by global 
economic inequalities.  Migrants seek not merely a new place, but a better place in the world.  
Most leave from poorer areas and go to richer areas, seeking jobs.  Most ethnic return migrants 
are therefore also international labor migrants.  They share many common experiences of non-
ethnic migrants, including low-paying and low-skilled jobs, discrimination, language barriers, 
visa legality issues, and the creation of migrant enclaves in the host community.   
 Yet in many ways ethnic return migration is a unique phenomenon.  Unlike other 
migrations, it is complicated by perceptions of a shared history, the expectation of social, 
political, and economic equality, altered or corrupted forms of a shared language, and kinship 
                                                 
2
 See Tsuda (2009) for detailed accounts of these migrations. 
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ties in the receiving community.  Takeyuki Tsuda, discussing ethnic return migrants in Japan, 
writes 
 "[e]thnic return migrants are interesting because many have become immigrant 
minorities in their countries of ethnic origin despite their ancestral ties and presumed 
ethnic similarities with the host populace.  Because of the ethnic affinity that the Japanese 
Brazilians feel with the Japanese, their ethnic and socioeconomic marginalization in 
Japan is quite disorienting and introduces complications in their identity and adaptation 
that other immigrants in Japan do not face" (Tsuda 2003, xv). 
 
 This highlights the importance of the geographical imagination in constructing diasporas.  
The idea of the diaspora itself has been used in increasingly diverse ways since the 1970s, 
growing from a synonym for the global Jewish population to a more general description of 
globally-dispersed communities of various affiliations (Brubaker 2005).  But the continued 
emphasis on a shared homeland and a distinctive identity fit well with broadly accepted ideas of 
ethnic grouping.  Ethnicity is everywhere a complicated idea; here I follow Max Weber‟s 
definition of ethnic groups as “those human groups that entertain a subjective belief in their 
common descent because of similarities of physical type or of customs or both” (Weber 1978, 
389).  Thus a belief in both ancestral and cultural commonality comprises ethnic identification.  
Ethnicity can serve as the basis for the political nation, but need not; often ethnic nationalism is 
juxtaposed with civic nationalism, when race- or culture-based group memberships do not 
conform to political boundaries (Hansen and Hesli 2009).   But both civic and ethnic nations can 
be characterized by Anderson‟s classic definition, “an imagined political community […] 
imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-
members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their 
communion” (1983, 7).  Thus definitions of both the ethnic and diasporic group hinge on 
members‟ own belief in their group identity.   
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 An important result of the subjective nature of ethnic identity is its potential for 
manipulation and re-interpretation (Harrell 1996).  Within a nation-state, ethnic interpretations 
can be dominated by entrenched local institutions – legislation, the media, education systems, tax 
codes.  All of these institutions have the ability to enforce a particular understanding of group 
characteristics.  The shared space of the nation-state brings different interpretations into direct 
contact, resulting in conflict, consensus, or dialogue.  However, diasporic people see themselves 
as sharing a particular identity across long distances.  Characteristics of the shared identity can 
be mediated through family ties and traditions, newspapers, and increasingly internet-based 
technology.  But the dispersed nature of diasporic people means that many aspects of their 
collective identity do not share the same space, and are not directly revealed to group members 
in other places. 
 Conflicting understandings of group identity can be unproblematic across wide distances.  
However, when dispersed groups come back together – as in the case of ethnic return migration 
– the imagined similarities come face to face and can suddenly appear quite different.  Ongoing 
changes in language, diet, dress habits, and standards of behavior can make commonplace 
interactions difficult and jarring experiences.  Ethnic Germans scattered through the former 
Soviet Union repatriated in large numbers from 1950 through the present day; not fluent in 
German, under-educated compared to German youth and unfamiliar with the German socialist 
system, long-term unemployment and high crime rates have created a public backlash against 
them (von Koppenfels 2009).  Swedish Finns migrating into Sweden in the 1990s cite their 
unique intonation of the Swedish language as a strong and divisive display of difference 
(Hedberg 2009, 175).  Often it is the very characteristics that migrants believed marked them as 
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belonging to their ethnic group – unique food, language, or dress – that instead exclude them 
from it upon return. 
 One result of this unforeseen conflict can be disillusionment with prior ideas of ethnic 
brotherhood and contestation over the true definition of the shared identity.  In the case of the 
ethnic Germans, “uniformly poor success in the hard-won „homeland‟ – with immigration 
achieved only after a long, bureaucratic process – is particularly demoralizing and causes 
Aussiedler [ethnic Germans] to look again at their own self-worth and identity” (von Koppenfels 
2009, 116).  A similar “discovery of difference” was made by Spanish natives upon the arrival of 
their Argentine Spanish co-ethnics; “Locals observed that despite religious and linguistic 
differences, Romanian immigrants were „more like us‟ than the Latin American newcomers in 
their ethic of hard work and modest expectations” (Cook-Martin and Viladrich 2009, 145, 
emphasis added).  Unexpected boundaries demarking us and them leave ethnic return migrants 
wondering what ethnic identity, if any, they truly possess.   
 Ultimately the conflict over divergent cultural identities is a struggle for the power to 
define cultural boundaries and the nation itself.  That power usually remains in the hands of 
those who control the physical homeland.  These people have the ability to legally define 
citizenship and belonging, and by extension can define who is foreign.  This appears prominently 
in the literature on co-ethnic policy; as Skrentny et al (2009) describe, “in deciding how to treat 
co-ethnic nonnationals, states are in effect defining the boundaries of the nation” (45).  That 
boundary can stretch and shrink as necessary.  Its flexibility is enabled and encouraged by the 
flexible and multi-dimensional definition of ethnicity itself. 
 Ethnicity is usually conceptualized both racially and culturally.  However, these two 
aspects of ethnicity can be conflated.  Ethnic return migrants‟ descent, previously unquestioned, 
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can suddenly become suspect as cultural differences emerge.  That a supposedly place-based 
identity should not belong in its supposed place raises questions about where it does belong.  
Ethnic return migrants‟ sense of identity, previously tied up with their imagined homeland but 
suddenly uprooted and without a spatial fix, often turns back to the country of migratory origin.  
Their claim to belonging to the ethnic nation, a claim based causally on descent and materially 
on shared daily practices, is denied by their more powerful, homeland-based co-ethnics on the 
basis of cultural divergence.  This cultural divergence is often described as a loss of cultural 
heritage (D.S. Kim and J.M. Kim, 2005).  Culture thus appears as a proprietary commodity, 
something which can be owned, lost, claimed, and denied at will. 
 These contestations have been academically treated most often in terms of economic 
relationships.  In fact most ethnic return migration in the context of East Asia is economically-
motivated, with migrants seeking industrial jobs and host countries seeking cheap labor.
3
  This is 
certainly true in China, Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea, all of which have experienced growing 
ethnic return migration in the last twenty years.  The Japanese experience has been discussed 
extensively in academic literature (cf. Linger 1997, Cornelius 1994, Tsuda 2003, Tsuda 2009).  
Chinese and Taiwanese ethnic return migration, especially from Southeast Asia, has received 
less attention, perhaps because of the smaller numbers (Skrentny et al 2009).  The South Korean 
case, though, has been mostly ignored, despite clear connections to these similar processes 
elsewhere.  In South Korea, ethnic return migration, mostly of the Korean minority in China, has 
been economically motivated with poverty in the sending area as the primary “push” factor.  
Large-scale ethnic return migration for the explicit goal of reunification has not been reported.
4
   
                                                 
3
 European and Israeli ethnic return migration has arisen more in response to perceived persecution of co-ethnics 
living as minorities outside of the ethnic homeland; this difference will be discussed in greater detail below. 
4
 There is, however, a growing literature on both students and tourists who travel to their nation of ethnic origin 
explicitly to experience and “reclaim” their ethnic heritage; see Su and Teo 2009. 
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1.2  The Role of Culture 
 Is it possible, then, to understand ethnic return migration through a political economy 
approach?  Can it be read as an attempt to call in connections to more powerful players in order 
to advance a migrant‟s personal standing in the global economy?  As will be discussed in the 
second chapter, the Korean Chinese were first suggested as a co-ethnic labor force by a South 
Korean business coalition, opposed by South Korean labor unions.  Occurring at a time when 
wages were rapidly rising to compensate for a lack of low-skilled workers, the shared cultural 
characteristics could be read as a tool in this labor struggle.  Images of cultural affinity were used 
to persuade the South Korean public to accept foreign workers; similarly, South Korean labor 
unions have played on the Korean Chinese' "Chineseness" to push back against perceived labor 
competition (N.H.J. Kim 2008).  The governments of both South Korea and China initially had 
little to do with this migration, but fairly quickly introduced regulations that served their national 
economic interests.  Their Korean heritage is the means by which Korean Chinese gain entry to 
the South Korean labor and marriage markets, with clear economic benefits for the Korean 
Chinese.  The power to define Koreanness obviously has material implications for all involved, 
and struggles over that power could push us to understand this case through political economy.   
 Yet after the legal framework for Korean Chinese in-migration had been established – a 
process largely completed by 1992, and modified just twice since then – public discourse has 
centered on issues of assimilation, not economic positioning.  The government has clearly 
defined the economic spaces that Korean Chinese may occupy: labor migrants may work in the 
3-D (dirty, difficult, dangerous) industries, or for marriage migrants, the domestic sphere.  The 
Korean Chinese in general have not contested this.  Rather they have disputed their systematic 
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cultural disenfranchisement, protesting not their limited access to labor markets based on their 
Chinese citizenship but their social exclusion as not-Korean-enough.   
 South Koreans, for their part, fault the Korean Chinese for failing to act properly Korean.  
But one government official interviewed declared that “their dialect is almost another language, 
and their clothes and makeup look strange.  They don‟t understand public courtesy either – they 
tend to drink in public” (personal interview, Aug. 9, 2010).  Special co-ethnic work and marriage 
visas were issued on the assumption that Korean Chinese people would not bring such foreign 
cultural elements with them.  This deal was sold as something of a quid pro quo for the South 
Korean public, a way to allow South Korean businesses to access low-cost labor without tainting 
Korea‟s prized ethnic homogeneity.  South Koreans seem to have initially viewed the Korean 
Chinese as a non-foreign cultural group, whose nonetheless foreign political status allow them to 
occupy the low-skilled and low-wage economic positions that South Korean citizens reject for 
themselves.  The problems inherent in this contradiction – in treating Korean Chinese as 
sometimes-foreign and sometimes-domestic – did not become apparent until the Korean Chinese 
„failed‟ to live up to cultural expectations.     
The Korean Chinese, while accepting the areas of employment open to them on their 
special visas, express indignation, frustration, and anger over their cold reception by their South 
Korean co-ethnics.  They are keenly aware of their predicament as almost-foreign.  During one 
interview with a Korean Chinese man, I asked how he and other Korean Chinese people felt 
about their treatment in South Korea.  He stopped our interview to find a dictionary and translate 
the word “betrayal” for me, concerned that I might not fully understand.  Continuing in Korean, 
he said “We thought we were Koreans, but here we aren‟t.  The Korean Americans and the 
Korean Japanese are more welcome, because they aren‟t coming from poverty” (personal 
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interview, July 20, 2010).  Other foreign groups in South Korea are not expected to speak 
Korean well, but the Korean Chinese are often criticized for their "old-fashioned" Korean which 
is closer in dialect to North Korean.  Southeast Asian migrant wives are celebrated for bringing 
"multiculturalism" to South Korea, while Korean Chinese migrant brides complain that their 
South Korean husbands won't eat their Korean cooking, because the husbands find it too Chinese 
(Freeman 2005).  But the Korean Chinese see no reason to view their version of Korean culture 
as inauthentic; indeed, official Chinese minority policy has worked to preserve Korean cultural 
markers in ways that South Korea has not.  Thus the Korean language is legally protected in the 
Korean minority area, and has not taken on foreign loan words for new technologies (unlike in 
South Korea, where words like computer, camera, and internet are all phonetic renderings of 
their English translations).  Similarly, the South Korean diet has adopted new ingredients 
especially from the West, while Korean Chinese cooking tends to rely on traditional home-grown 
ingredients.  The Korean Chinese are thus understandably perplexed when they are accused of 
being culturally foreign. 
All of this indicates that culture operates not as a discursive tool in a struggle over 
political economy, but as its own site of struggle.  This is not to deny that cultural struggles are 
political and economic, or to suggest that culture exists as a realm apart.  There are clearly vested 
interests seeking to define cultural boundaries, with the benefits including power and money on a 
transnational scale.  But the important point is that neither power nor money is the ultimate 
objective of the groups in this discourse.  People are here instead seeking legitimacy for their 
very sense of selves, for their traditional understandings of their heritage and their family 
traditions and their deeply held beliefs about themselves.  Debating whether rice-noodles qualify 
20 
 
as Korean food has few large-scale economic repercussions, outside of the rice-noodle industry.
5
  
Such debates instead highlight how boundary-making functions in shaping group identities.   
Here then, I hope to address how this struggle to define cultural boundaries, meanings, and 
identities manifests in national policies and personal decisions.  Immigration policies, citizenship 
requirements, government-sponsored Korean cooking classes, marriage, employment, and 
migration decisions, all demonstrate particular understandings of who and what is Korean.  
While these decisions certainly have political and economic repercussions, their larger effect is 
to further one idea of proper Korean culture at the expense of others.  The power of such 
decisions is clear in South Korean co-ethnic policy, where a legal definition of different types of 
Korean people is explicit.  But it can also be seen in the assumptions and effects driving the 
personal decisions of participants.   
Both labor and marriage migration are highly gendered processes, and reinforce shared 
and conflicting beliefs about proper gender roles.  For both the Korean Chinese and the South 
Koreans, it is acceptable that either single or married men can leave families in China to work 
industrial jobs in the South Korea and send their earnings home.  It is less typical for married 
women to migrate, and South Koreans tend to feel shocked by this.  Single women though are 
encouraged to migrate and to find work in bars, coffee shops, small restaurants or shops, or best 
of all, to marry South Korean men.  As one Korean Chinese informant told me, “Korean Chinese 
women are really encouraged to come for work, and then they can meet a South Korean husband.  
It‟s better than the agency-arranged marriages” (personal interview, July 27, 2010).  Some 
conflict has arisen over the proper place for Korean Chinese women after they have married 
South Korean men: whether they should work outside the home and send their earnings back to 
                                                 
5
 In two interviews, South Koreans cited the eating of a particular type of rice-noodle as evidence of the Korean 
Chinese people‟s un-Korean behavior.  Several Korean Chinese women took strong issue with this, insisting that 
their mothers (who were Korean before the category of Korean Chinese existed) made and ate these rice-noodles. 
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China, or focus their energies on reproducing their marital households.  This is discussed more 
fully in the Chapter 4, but should be noted here as it highlights the division of loyalties created 
by the conflict over Koreanness.  South Koreans hold that Korean women give up their natal 
families at marriage; by retaining ties with parents, siblings, and extended family in China, 
Korean Chinese women are accused of showing Chineseness. 
Not only gender but also racial beliefs become apparent in the debate over whose Korean 
culture is legitimate.  The South Korean state, only 63 years old and covering less than half of 
the Korean peninsula, nonetheless considers itself the only legitimate political representative of 
the Korean nation.  The Korean nation, in turn, is most widely perceived as racial; Shin (2006) 
reports on a Hallym University survey in which “68.2 percent of the respondents in South Korea 
consider „blood‟ the most important criterion of defining the Korean nation” and that in his own 
survey “[n]inety-three percent of the respondents reported, „Our nation has a single bloodline‟” 
(2).  The state thus grants differential access to visas based on a person‟s perceived blood-purity.  
Korean Americans, the most recent out-migrants, have the most generous and readily-accessible 
visas; Korean Japanese, most of whom were taken there forcibly during the Second World War 
and many of whom have still not given up Korean citizenship, are second-best.
6
  Korean Chinese, 
who are assumed to have left Korea willingly during the Japanese occupation (although this is 
not universally true, as will be discussed in Chapter 2), appear to South Koreans as having 
embraced a Chinese identity and become in many ways racially polluted.  This debate arises 
because of the already-mentioned problematic definition of ethnicity, which encompasses and 
often conflates culture and race.  Racial discourses about the Korean Chinese tend to reflect a 
belief that racial characteristics manifest as cultural practices.  Thus South Korean fears of 
                                                 
6
 Tsuda (2003, x) reports that “There are approximately 600,000 Korean Japanese who are still registered in Japan as 
“foreigners.”  Although 90 percent of them were born and raised in Japan (Ryang 1997:3), they are not granted 
Japanese citizenship, and many have not naturalized.” 
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cultural pollution are deeply tied to their understanding of the Korean nation as a racially 
homogenous group. 
Ultimately the Korean Chinese are given special treatment in South Korean immigration 
policy because of assumptions about shared cultural values and practices.  South Koreans 
expected Korean Chinese migrants to act like South Koreans; this was the reason the Korean 
Chinese were granted preferential access to labor and marriage markets.  Korean Chinese 
migrants, encouraged for 60 years by the Chinese government to preserve Korean cultural traits, 
had no reason to suspect that their habits would differ from South Koreans‟.  Initial assumptions 
did not necessarily reflect empirical reality though, and the meeting of idealized imaginings with 
unexpected reality resulted in disillusionment for both sides.  Understanding this disillusionment 
requires more than an orthodox political economy framework can offer, because those initial 
assumptions were based on cultural expectations.  We must bring in critical understandings of 
how culture interacts with politics and economics to comprehend what has and is happening in 
Korean Chinese migration. 
 
1.3  Cultural Political Economy in Geography 
 Such cultural influences have certainly been noted within the discipline of political 
economy.  Neoclassical political economy has been roundly and effectively criticized for 
discounting cultural and social aspects of life and treating the economic as a sphere apart.  
Marxist approaches began here in addressing the social class consequences of various means of 
production.  Later critiques, especially those arising after the cultural turn of the 1960s, have 
gone further in expanding the analytical range of political economy.  Among these newer 
approaches, cultural political economy (CPE) seems to offer a multi-faceted and nuanced 
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approach that does not resort to oversimplification or reductionist explanations.  However, CPE 
has been defined and deployed in different and inconsistent ways by various authors.  . 
 Critics of political economy have long noted its problematic assumption of “the economy” 
as a separate ontological reality.  But this was not present in the earliest classical articulations of 
political economy.  Indeed the very theorists who worked to establish political economy as a 
discipline apart commented on the necessary social impacts of their theories; Adam Smith, in his 
Wealth of Nations, explicitly predicts the human impacts of pursuing economic prosperity at an 
aggregate level; the capitalist division of labor leaves “the great body of the people […] confined 
to a few very simple operations… [with] no occasion to exert his understanding, or to exercise 
his invention in finding out expedients for removing difficulties which never occur…”  For the 
common man then,  
“the torpor of his mind renders him, not only incapable of relishing or bearing a part of any 
rational conversation, but of conceiving any generous, noble, or tender sentiment, and 
consequently of forming any just judgment concerning many even of the ordinary duties 
of private life. […] It corrupts even the activity of his body, and renders him incapable of 
exerting his strength with vigour and perseverance, in any other employment than that to 
which he has been bred” (Smith 1976, 302 – 303, quoted in Blaney and Inayatullah 2010, 
39).   
 
 Despite this clear connection drawn between the economic system and its social impacts, 
later neoclassical political economists seemed content to treat the economy as a sphere apart.  It 
was this treatment that Polanyi (1944) noted, explicating the unprecedented attempt to sever 
economic activity from the social sphere.  Removing the social ties that structured the economy, 
and instead encouraging people to calculate personal gain based on money alone was indeed a 
radical shift.  But as Best and Paterson (2010, 3) point out, “the „disembedding‟ of markets never 
in fact detached markets from culture, they rather reconstituted the content of that culture.”  Still, 
neoclassical political economy (and most mainstream economists) overwhelmingly accepted that 
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economics constituted a separate and rational (acultural) sphere of human life (Blaney and 
Inayatullah 2010, 32).   
 In part as a response to this, Marxist political economy pushed for recognition of the 
oppressive nature of capitalism by emphasizing the necessarily hierarchical relationships in 
capitalist endeavor.  But Marxist approaches often fail to explicitly note the equally cultural 
structures that enable this, instead giving ultimate causative power to distribution issues.  As one 
example, Don Mitchell (2000) writes “while culture itself does not exist, the idea of culture has 
been developed and deployed in the modern (and postmodern) world as a means of attempting to 
order, control and define „others‟ in the name of power and profit” (75, emphasis in original).  
Culture is here reduced to an exercise in power.  Similarly, Harvey (2006) argues that 
“ „Difference‟ and „otherness‟ are produced in space through the simple logic of uneven capital 
investment, a proliferating geographical division of labor, an increasing segmentation of 
reproductive activities and the rise of spatially ordered (often segregated) social distinctions” 
(295).  There is certainly value in examining the ways in which culture can be manipulated for 
political and economic ends.  The question of who defines culture, and which culture gets 
replicated, produced, and consumed (Mitchell 1995, 112), reveals important ways that power 
operate in everyday life.  Yet Jackson (2002) highlights the folly of making political economy 
primary or outside of culture; as he points out, “the apparently rational calculus of the market is 
inescapably embedded in a range of cultural processes” (5). To disregard culture, to write it off 
as a purely instrumental ploy of social control, is to deny its embodied and enacted reality.  For 
capitalism to exist in the first place, people must accept competitive exploitation as socially 
tolerable and allow for the very results that Adam Smith predicted – poverty, deprivation, and 
gross inequality.  If such behavior and such results were beyond the pale of social acceptability, 
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then such a distribution system would also be rejected.  The economic system is thus predicated 
upon particular cultural norms, which can themselves develop and change. 
 Since the cultural turn in the 1960s though, these cultural factors have received greater 
attention.  New critiques of political economy have arisen and revealed greater complexity, 
highlighting “globalization, governance, non-governmental organizations, networking, the 
knowledge-driven economy, the primacy of geo-economics over geo-politics, new forms of 
warfare, new forms of risk, environmental change, bodies and embodiment, and temporality and 
spatiality” (Jessop and Sum 2001, 90).  Andrew Sayer, writing in 2001, reviews the past twenty-
five years of work that seeks to bring the cultural turn to political economy; in his view, those 
concerned with the cultural turn have in fact gone too far in neglecting the political and 
economic aspects of their topics.  He argues for increased dialogue between work emphasizing 
systems and their emergent properties and the newer work which examines how “new and 
progressive moral-political influences […] attempt to counter those economic problems that 
originate in the lifeworld as consequences of various forms of discrimination and misrecognition” 
(Sayer 2001 705).    
 Since then though, CPE continues to include a broad range of work with sometimes-
conflicting theoretical frameworks.  It does seem possible to say that work in CPE approaches 
phenomena with the initial assumption that all human activity is simultaneously constituted 
though cultural, political, and economic interests.  Authors claiming this approach do not seek to 
reduce causation to one factor alone.  Yet disputes continue over how much relative weight and 
attention should be given to each aspect.   Mike Davies, reviewing the state of the field in 2010, 
finds that CPE is often taken to mean either a political economic analysis of cultural phenomena, 
or standard political economy with some cultural elements or influences noted.  He characterizes 
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these approaches in three general veins, as “suggest[ing] that crucial political economic 
processes have taken on a increasingly cultural characteristics”; “see[ing] cultural meanings as 
embedded in or even determining economic life”; or “call[ing] for an „ethnographic international 
political economy‟” (49 – 50).  Yet, as Davies points out, all of these approaches continue to 
separate culture and economy at a fundamental level.  Following Lefebvre‟s critique of the 
separation between mental and manual labor, we cannot view even basic manual labor as 
somehow devoid of cultural significance. 
 Among the most visible and persistent advocates of a CPE approach are Jessop and Sum, 
co-founders of the Cultural Political Economy Research Centre at Lancaster University.  
Beginning in 2000, these authors began publishing work on CPE, inspired partly by the decline 
of disciplinary boundaries and the decline of area studies in favor of “variations on 
institutionalism (historical, economic, rational choice, sociological, ideational) [which] offer 
different routes to a unified approach to comparative analysis” (2001, 90).  Jessop in particular 
has published prolifically on this subject.  His critique of standard political economy rests on 
four major points found lacking in standard political economy: the socially constructed nature of 
the objects of inquiry, the materiality of all social relations, the explanatory and interpretive 
power of semiosis, and the recognition of the reductive nature of all economic imaginaries 
(Jessop and Oosterlynck 2008, 1156 – 58).  By 2009 Jessop offers a fairly concise definition of 
his approach to CPE.  A CPE approach recognizes the role of semiosis in co-constituting subjects, 
objects, and social relations, yet remains concerned with “the materiality of social relations and 
[…] the structural properties and dynamics that result from such material relations” (Jessop and 
Sum 2009, 161).   
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 In ten years of attempting to „bring culture in‟ though, Jessop (and usually Sum) 
continuously and problematically equate culture with semiosis (semiosis defined as the “social 
production of inter-subjective meaning” (Jessop and Sum, 2010a 445)).  They do note that “in 
taking the „cultural turn‟, political economy should continue to emphasize the materiality of 
social relations” (2001, 94) but seem to see these material aspects of life as falling under the 
domain of political economy, while “culture” is limited to discursively-constructed and 
immaterial “meaning”.  Thus the cultural turn adds discursively-constructed semiotic analysis to 
a critical political economic analysis of the material world, which is apparently devoid of inter-
subjective meaning.  Yet as early as 2001 they offer an explicitly materialist definition of CPE, 
claiming that their approach to CPE arose directly from “Marxism as a pre-disciplinary 
intellectual tradition committed to the critique of political economy” and that their version of 
CPE seeks to “transcend the action/language distinction and to explore the complex „discursive-
material‟ nature of practices, organizations, and institutions” (2001, 92).  In 2004 they continued 
to criticize standard political economy for its tendency “to naturalize or reify its theoretical 
objects (such as land, machines, the division of labour, money, commodities, the information 
economy) and to offer impoverished accounts of how subjects and subjectivities are formed and 
how different modes of calculation emerge, come to be institutionalized, and get modified” 
(2004, 160).  However, Jessop‟s approach does seem to border on the problem Davis described 
by continuing to accept culture and economy as separate spheres of life, albeit co-constituting 
ones. 
 What Jessop hints at, but does not make explicit, is that no economic system could even 
theoretically exist outside of or apart from its cultural and social context.  Just as early political 
economy refused to see material distribution as separate from power distributions, so too must 
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culture be considered fundamental but not ultimate. Culture should be understood as both 
constitutive of people‟s political and economic decisions, as well as materially created through 
those same choices.   
 Despite some disagreement on their understanding of culture though, the methodological 
approach advocated by Jessop and Oosterlynck (2008) offers a practical way to consider cultural, 
economic, and political factors acting simultaneously.  Noting the reliance of economic 
imaginaries on semiotic meaning, it becomes necessary to probe how and why only certain 
meanings arise and hold salience.  The progression of variation, selection, and retention forces 
analysts to consider the specific cultural, political, and historical context in which a given 
economic imaginary arises.  Thus any economic phenomena is preemptively understood as 
culturally, politically, and economically affected. 
 
 Taking this understanding of cultural political economy as a starting point then, it informs 
a discussion of ethnic return migration in several key ways.  Migration itself cannot be viewed as 
a purely economic decision regarding allocation of labor; it is instead a complex social process 
open only to certain people, varying in different contexts based on age, gender, education, ability, 
and social capital.  Murphy (2009) raises this point in her discussion of Chinese labor migrants, 
showing the diverse range of causes and effects involved in migrations.  Everything from 
infrastructure to family structure is drawn in.  Migration can only occur between areas with 
certain characteristics; conditions in sending areas must allow for out-migration physically and 
socially, and receiving areas must provide some (even minor) draw, as well as basic facilities 
like accommodation and transportation.  While migration is often motivated by uneven economic 
development, it cannot be divorced from the social and political conditions in which it occurs.  
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And conditions are always unique.  Migration between South Korea and China is limited to the 
very recent past, beginning in 1992 with a rush of migrants and remaining steady since then.  
South Korea had just at that time become a migrant-receiving country, and has struggled 
mightily with that new role.  Building a legal and social system to accommodate foreign 
migrants is far more than an economic issue.  China, long a migrant-sending country, has found 
new ways to benefit from its population abroad, instituting educational programs to facilitate the 
migration experience and to ensure that migrants retain a strong sense of loyalty to the home 
nation. 
 From a local governance perspective, this loyalty is best expressed through the sending of 
remittances.  Sending money home from abroad must then also be viewed as a cultural process 
that makes, re-makes, or retains ties between the migrant and the sending family or community.  
The central and local governments in China overseeing the Korean Chinese migrants‟ home 
communities have especially emphasized the importance of remittances, going as far as offering 
classes in how to transfer funds back from abroad (Luova 2008, 39).  Even with this official 
encouragement though, the decision to send one‟s earnings elsewhere is made by individuals 
enmeshed in social relationships.  Questions of how much to send, to whom to send it, and how 
to use the sent money are all affected by extra-economic forces.  A cultural political economy 
approach allows us to consider these other forces, and better understand the full range of 
meaning tied up in migrant remittances. 
 Perhaps most importantly, ethnic return migration must be viewed as a special sub-set of 
international migration which draws heavily on ideas of cultural and historical affinity.  Not to 
downplay the cultural aspects of all migration, the flows of ethnic return migration arise 
explicitly from an assumption of ethnic (hence racial and cultural) continuity between the 
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migrants and the receiving area.  While all conceptions of set or unified cultures can 
problematically erase difference, ideas of cultural continuity with an unknown area or group can 
be especially far off-target.  This assumption could produce contrary results.  It could be a force 
in actually creating continuity; people thinking they ought to share cultural characteristics may 
be motivated to seek common ground.  On the other hand, when a group of people is 
unexpectedly faced with „others‟ when they had anticipated the „self,‟ the shock could produce a 
negative backlash.    
 
1.4  A Case for Comparison: Ethnic Return Migration of the Japanese Brazilians 
 In actual studies of ethnic return, there has been a mixture of these results.  The majority 
of academic work investigating ethnic return migration focuses on Eastern Europe and Russia in 
the post-WWII era.  This work can be divided into several sub-groups, most prominently the 
work on the general Jewish diasporic „return‟ to Israel (Joppke 2002), but also including the 
post-Soviet return of specifically Russian Jews (Remennick 2009), ethnic German migration 
from the former Soviet bloc (Rock and Wolff 2002), Hungarians returning from Romania (Fox 
2009), and the post-Soviet migrations of ethnic Russians (Lazareva 2008), Poles (Iglicka 1998), 
Swedes (Hedberg 2009), and others.  However, as Skrentny et al (2009) point out, European 
ethnic return migration policies have been designed to provide a form of protection for co-
ethnics living outside the national boundaries.  That is, the co-ethnics who live as minorities 
elsewhere are assumed to face persecution; return migration is a way for the homeland to assist 
its people.  Return migration in East Asia though is quite different.  In China, South Korea, and 
Japan, ethnic return migration policy has been framed in economic terms.  Co-ethnics abroad are 
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described as potential assets to the homeland, available to contribute labor, skills, or investment 
capital to the national economy.  The co-ethnics in this case are expected to assist the homeland. 
 This expectation is well-illustrated by the example of Japanese Brazilian ethnic return 
migration.  The Japanese minority in Brazil, a group of about 1.2 million people, began 
migrating to Brazil in the early 1900s.  Japan was suffering economically at that time, and 
Brazil‟s plantation economy was starved for labor due to the recent abolition of slavery (Tsuda 
2003, 56).  Ongoing migration continued through the 1960s, and the Japanese Brazilians now 
have up to four generations of residency in Brazil.  Despite this hundred-year history, the 
Japanese remain a distinct minority.  This is partly due to the distinguishing East Asian 
phenotype; as Tsuda writes, “this racially inscribed „Japaneseness‟ is experienced by the 
Brazilian nikkeijin [Japanese descendents] as a primordial ethnic identity based on innate 
characteristics acquired by birth that cannot be denied or changed” (2003, 64).  Yet the Japanese 
Brazilians have actively maintained a separate cultural identity as well, speaking Japanese at 
home and marrying mostly fellow Japanese Brazilians.  Their economic success within Brazil 
has led non-Japanese Brazilians to construe them as a positive minority.  This has been 
encouraged as well by the positive association with Japan, perceived in Brazil as an advanced 
nation on the world stage.  A Japanese Brazilian minority identity thus has tangible benefits, a 
fact that has discouraged greater assimilation.  Japanese Brazilians in Brazil then maintain a 
fairly high socio-economic position while experiencing both racial „othering‟ by non-Japanese 
Brazilians and a degree of cultural self-segregation.   
 By the 1980s though, the economic balance that had encouraged migration to Brazil had 
shifted.  The Japanese economy boomed, but the Japanese population simultaneously aged and 
experienced high standards of living and levels of education.  Japan found itself in need of 
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younger, low-skilled workers.  While Japanese immigration policy in the 1980s restricted work 
visas to first- and second-generation Japanese, by the 1990s this was relaxed to allow for up to 
third-generation Japanese descendents.  Visas for non-Japanese remained rare.  With even basic 
factory jobs in Japan paying 5 to 10 times more than middle-class jobs in Brazil, the Japanese 
Brazilians were reasonably enticed (Tsuda 2003, 85).  The Brazilian economy at this same time 
experienced ongoing decline.  Brazilians of all types suffered and turned to international 
migration as a coping strategy.  The U.S., Germany, England, Australia and Spain each received 
thousands of Brazilian labor migrants through the 1980s and 90s.  But the Japanese Brazilians 
chose almost uniformly to seek work in Japan.  The trans-national ethnic link was clearly not the 
motivation for leaving the natal country, but rather channeled migrants in a unique direction. 
 The wealth accrued by Japanese Brazilians working in Japan produced a steady stream of 
trans-Pacific migration, and out-migration to work in Japanese factories became a common and 
accepted occupational choice among well-educated middle-class Japanese Brazilians.  Chain 
migration among friends, families, and neighbors encouraged this trend.  By 2000, over 250,000 
Japanese Brazilians were registered as foreigners in Japan (Tsuda 2003, 98).  But such high 
numbers do not mean this migration has been unproblematic or easy for either the migrants or 
the host population.  The Japanese Brazilians, professing a strong sense of Japanese identity 
when in Brazil, anticipated strengthening their Japanese identity upon immersion in Japanese 
society.  Expressing similar expectations, the official Japanese immigration policy gave 
preference to ethnic Japanese from abroad not for explicitly economic reasons, but instead “as an 
opportunity provided by the benevolence of the Japanese government to those of Japanese 
descent born abroad to explore their ethnic heritage and visit their ancestral homeland” (Kajita 
1994, quoted in Tsuda 2003, 92).  While there is undoubtedly some irony to this statement, it 
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does highlight the belief in an ethnic and cultural connection as the enabling factor for migration.  
When the two groups‟ understanding of how to properly enact Japanese identity was found to 
differ then, both groups were left frustrated.  As Tsuda (2003) summarizes, 
“…[D]espite geographical separation and different national backgrounds, a 
consciousness of transnational ethnic commonality with nikkeijin has been created 
among the Japanese because of essentialist ethnic feelings of cultural similarity based on 
the primacy of racial and blood ties […] Therefore, the cultural foreignness of the 
nikkeijin and the inability of most of them to speak the language properly are 
disillusioning and disappointing for most Japanese” (117).   
 
 Within Brazil, the Japanese minority is clearly marked racially as Japanese.  But their 
Japanese identity also rests on cultural practices such as speaking the Japanese language, eating 
sushi and noodle dishes, and participating in Japanese hobbies like flower arranging, tea 
ceremonies, and karaoke (Tsuda 2003, 71 and 158).  These visible performative activities are 
enough to clearly mark them as a cultural minority in Brazil.  In Japan though, these behaviors 
are not enough.  Countless other actions, done or left undone, differentiate the Japanese 
Brazilians from the Japanese.  In Tsuda‟s interviews, Japanese people cited behaviors such as 
jaywalking, wearing brightly-colored clothing, playing the guitar, singing in the shower, 
speaking loudly on the streets, improperly sorting garbage, and standing idly about in groups as 
clear evidence that the Japanese Brazilians were foreign (Tsuda 2003, 124).  True Japanese 
would know better. 
 These actions, construed as contrary to proper Japanese behavior, are observed in 
individuals and then abstracted to the entire group of Japanese Brazilians through ethnic 
attribution.  This feeds into a larger dialogue of cultural purity in Japan.  Many Japanese are 
fairly explicit in their disdain for foreign influences in Japan.  Since the 1868 – 1912 Meiji era, 
Japan has consistently encouraged a discourse of ethnic and linguistic homogeneity as the basis 
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for the Japanese nation (Shikama 2005, 183).  Clear distinctions between the Japanese and the 
foreign have been entrenched through both tradition and law, with strict citizenship laws based 
on jus sanguinis and, since 1990, immigration law based also on direct Japanese descent.  
 Relatively recent discussions of multiculturalism continue to reinforce the idea that the 
(pure) Japanese can exist among (impure) foreign elements
7
.  The Japanese Brazilians though 
blur this distinction, by appearing physically Japanese yet failing to conform to Japanese 
behavioral norms.  Shikama (2005) also articulates this point; “Because they share some features 
with the Japanese but not others, the Nikkeijin are affecting, however subtly, notions of Japanese 
identity, undermining the simple binary opposition of „Japanese v. non-Japanese‟ which has long 
been taken for granted” (188).  While this use of nikkeijin refers to all ethnic Japanese people of 
foreign citizenship, the experience of the Japanese Brazilians is further affected by the global 
economic position of Brazil relative to Japan.  Just as Japan is a respected country in Brazil, so 
Brazil is perceived as a backwards, poor, and of low cultural standards by the Japanese.  Existing 
in Brazilian space, the Japanese Brazilians have absorbed the impure foreign elements and are no 
longer purely Japanese.  “Because of this foreign cultural contamination, the Japanese Brazilians 
have become anomalous and ambiguous beings who are racially Japanese but culturally foreign” 
(Tsuda 2003, 132).  Existing somewhere between the Japanese and the foreign, the Japanese 
Brazilians are even stranger than the clearly foreign.  This framing of the Japanese Brazilians as 
impure appears repeatedly in Tsuda‟s interviews; as he quotes one Japanese informant, “„[w]e 
feel culturally superior to the nikkeijin because we have real Japanese culture while they have 
only contaminated Japanese culture.  They aren‟t pure Japanese anymore, even if they look just 
like us‟” (131, emphasis added).   
                                                 
7
 For a fascinating discussion, see Graburn, Ertl, and Tierney 2008, esp. Okubo‟s chapter 9 on foreign children in 
Japanese public education. 
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 The liminal existence of the Japanese Brazilians is further reinforced by their 
occupational status.  Despite continuing labor shortages, non-Japanese-descent foreigners cannot 
obtain unskilled work visas into Japan at all, reflecting a general xenophobic attitude in Japan.  
That Japanese Brazilians are allowed to work unskilled jobs indicates that they are not the same 
as other foreigners.  Yet by working the low-skill jobs that the Japanese themselves shun, they 
are also marked as non-Japanese, implicitly sub-Japanese.  The economic positioning of the 
Japanese Brazilians thus reinforces a cultural stereotype that serves to legitimate and propagate 
the ethnic hierarchy.   
 Japanese Brazilians thus come from a home country where they are a successful and 
positive minority group, and arrive in their ethnic homeland to find themselves again not of the 
majority population, instead a new and negative minority.  “In response to such negative 
experiences, many of them distance themselves from their previous transnational ethnic 
affiliation with the Japanese and assert a much stronger Brazilian counteridentity in opposition to 
Japanese society” (Tsuda 2003, 155).  This Brazilian counter-identity consisted of engaging in 
explicitly Brazilian behavior such as eating Brazilian food and dancing samba – things that the 
Japanese Brazilians admitted avoiding in Brazil.  Reactionary nationalism in this sense reflects 
an irony of migration; when people become physically untethered from their place of territorial 
citizenship, they may become more emotionally attached.  Migration thus does not necessarily 
result in a post-modern, post-national consciousness, but can actually exasperate conflicts, 
retrench territorial ideas of nationhood, and create new boundaries between peoples (Tsuda 2003, 
221).   
 Tsuda argues that the experience of the Japanese Brazilians upon return migration  to 
Japan eventually creates a new minority, one that does not have an ethnic homeland but exists 
36 
 
between two others‟.  The Japanese Brazilians are identifiable as a minority group in both Japan 
and Brazil.  Their reaction has been to identify more strongly with their natal country and with 
the Brazilian aspects of their identity.  Tsuda questions why this has not created a 
deterritorialized identity, one that does not require a bounded nation-state to root in but grows 
instead from the shared experience of a mobile population.  “Ironically, the most distinctive 
aspect of a transnational migrant community is not what it has, but what does not have – a 
consciousness” (Tsuda 2003, 258).  Rather than becoming a subversive or counter-hegemonic 
experience that transcends national identity, ethnic return migration in this case reinforces the 
importance of the nation-state. 
  
 The Japanese Brazilian example speaks in many ways to the situation of the Korean 
Chinese.  Both groups start the migration process as a positive minority in their natal homeland.  
Both groups have consciously maintained their ethnic culture over the past hundred years, and 
showed marked economic and educational success as a minority.  Their ethnic homelands 
explicitly value homogeneity in their populations, conceptualized in both racial and cultural 
terms and enacted through preferential immigration policies. Both groups then receive favored 
migration opportunities back to their ethnic homeland, based on their supposedly pure ethnicity 
which will not contaminate the host population, but based also on the need fill the low-skill 
economic positions that true citizens of the ethnic homeland shun.  These ethnic preferences, 
irrational and deeply held, affect and are affected by local and global economic inequalities and 
national, international, and ethnic hierarchies of power.  Ethnic return migration therefore cannot 
be understood as an isolated economic process.  Any approach to this issue must include 
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consideration of the historical, cultural, and political context in both the sending and receiving 
areas. 
 Korean Chinese return migration too has apparent and unique cultural features that drive 
and shape it.  Social, political, and economic conditions in South Korea had to first create the 
opportunity for in-migration.  While the South Korean population has long touted their 
homogeneity as a source of internal stability, in the last ten years the foreign population residing 
there has increased dramatically.  This has initiated a public debate about the value or desirability 
of multiculturalism.  Like Japan, a growing middle class unwilling to perform unskilled labor 
prodded the South Korean government to liberalize its policy towards foreign workers.  However, 
unlike Japan, South Korea was simultaneously motivated by a national gender-ratio imbalance 
that left almost two generations of South Korean men with limited and increasingly competitive 
chances for marriage or reproduction.  This gender-ratio imbalance, as a precondition for Korean 
Chinese marriage migration, itself reflects the complex interaction between culture, politics, and 
economics, as it appears to result chiefly from the high costs associated with raising a successful 
child in South Korea, combined with a traditional preference for boys.  Absent these distinctive 
demographic and economic conditions, it is unclear whether the Korean Chinese would have 
been granted preferential work visas in South Korea. 
The initial placement of the Korean Chinese within China also created a population 
willing and able to out-migrate.  The linguistic isolation of the Korean Chinese, as well as their 
limited social and economic ties to other areas of China, left them at a disadvantage in the post-
reform era.  Chinese minority policy had encouraged them to preserve their Korean cultural 
identity; while few of the Korean Chinese can actually trace their ancestral roots to South Korea 
(most come from regions in present-day North Korea) they nonetheless retained a belief that they 
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were Koreans in China.   Through daily reenactment of this Korean identity in language, food, 
work and family habits, the Korean Chinese constructed an emotional rapport with South Korea 
that did not exist with other potential migratory destinations.  Their ability to retain this identity 
is not itself a natural fact.  To understand how the Korean Chinese remained Korean within 
China, a more thorough discussion of their history and interactions with the Chinese state is 
necessary. 
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CHAPTER 2:  
Chinese Minority Policy and Ethnic Nationalism 
2.1  Background of the Korean Chinese in Northeast China 
 The Korean Chinese have developed their present identity within the geographic and 
political bounds of the People‟s Republic of China.  This history itself is not isolated from the 
larger history of China, from the experiences of other minorities therein, or from developments 
in the larger northeast Asian region.  Therefore the social, political, and economic situation of the 
Korean Chinese prior to the beginning of migration in 1992 sets the stage for out-migration.  
This situation must be understood as the result of 100 years of change in northeast Asia, changes 
which have given rise to the political divisions dominating the region today. 
 The area that comprises present-day Jilin Province in Northeast China was in 1850 a 
peripheral region held weakly by the Qing Dynasty.  The Korean peninsula, then under Chosun 
rule, experienced a series of droughts and famines through the mid- to late-1800s which 
prompted many Korean rice farmers to seek cropland elsewhere.  The area directly north of the 
Korean peninsula was largely unpopulated, and many Koreans settled there despite an official 
Qing ban on immigration (J.Y. Lee 2002, 119).   By the 1860s, an estimated 77,000 Koreans 
from the northeastern Korean peninsula were residing north of the Tumen and Yalu rivers, on 
Chinese territory (D.S. Kim and J.M. Kim 2005, 83).  This economically-motivated migration 
continued through 1900.  In 1905 though, with the Japanese encroaching on Korean territory, 
political refugees began to flee north.  When Korea became a full colony of Japan in 1910, the 
influx of refugees increased dramatically.  The immigrating Koreans were a mixture of political 
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refugees and dispossessed farmers who migrated voluntarily to escape the Japanese.  By 1920, 
the Korean population was an estimated 298,900 (J.Y. Lee 2002, 119). 
 The situation changed again in 1931, when Japan pushed north of the Korean Peninsula 
and established the semi-independent state of Manchukuo in what is now Northeast China.  
Given the vast terrain and sparse population, the Japanese initially had trouble asserting any 
degree of real control.  They attempted to redress this by forcing large numbers of Korean 
“settlers” to relocate to distant parts of Manchukuo, where they lived in enclosed “villages” from 
which they could not leave.  This practice ended after 1942, when labor shortages in Japan 
inspired the deportation of Koreans to Japan instead.  Still, Jeanyoung Lee (2002, 120) estimates 
that by 1945 the permanent Korean population in northeast stood at 2,163,514, having grown 
rapidly due to this forced resettlement program.  This number is contradicted by Si Joong Kim 
(2003) who puts the number closer to 1.7 million.  Both agree though that the Korean population 
in northeastern China more than doubled under Japanese rule.  
 The early history of Koreans in northeastern China brings up several relevant points.  
First, and most importantly, the Koreans immigrated into China mostly within living history.  
Unlike most other minorities in China, they were not conquered by the Chinese.  Even those 
Koreans brought to China by force could not fault the Chinese for this, and also had the option at 
the end of the Second World War to return to Korea.  This element of choice does much to 
explain the good relations between the Korean minority and the Chinese.  Additionally though, 
most Korean immigrants went to China in search of refuge.  Driven by crop failure, dispossessed 
of their land and rights, sometimes deported by force, the Korean communities in present-day 
Jilin Province moved or remained there because it proved a better residence than Korea.   
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 Northeast China additionally served as the political base for the Korean resistance 
movement and the related Korean Communist Party during the Japanese occupation (Jian 1994).  
Many Korean political refugees in China during colonial times chose to join the movement 
against the Japanese, which was organized primarily by the communist group.  Once the 
Japanese moved north of the Tumen River and into China proper, this group joined the People‟s 
Liberation Army (the Chinese Communist army, at that time allied with the Chinese Nationalists 
and fighting against the Japanese).  Kim Il-sung was one of these early organizers; his military 
leadership positioned him to transition quickly into a political role at the end of the war.  Indeed, 
the new government of North Korea consisted almost entirely of the core military leaders from 
the Korean resistance, who had worked and fought alongside the Chinese communists during the 
Second World War. 
World War II ended in northeast China with the arrival of the Soviet Army in August 
1945.  The Soviets remained in control of the region until the following May, giving the Chinese 
Communists time to regroup in the area.  The Soviets expelled all Japanese settlers in the region, 
thereby opening up land for Korean farmers.  Most of the Koreans who migrated (or were forced 
to migrate) during the war chose to remain and were allowed to do so (J.Y. Lee 2002).  The 
treaty ending the war was actually signed by the Chinese Nationalists, allied at that time with the 
Chinese Communists.  But the war against the Japanese in Manchuria had been fought primarily 
by Soviet Union troops, so the Japanese surrender left the Soviet Union in control of much of 
Northeast China.  The Soviet departure left the Communists in charge; the Communists‟ 
aggressive guerrilla tactics against the Japanese during the war in the Northeast also gave them a 
base of popular support.  With civil war between the Nationalists and Communists resuming in 
1946, the Nationalists began to push heavily into the northeast.  In a reversal of the WWII 
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situation, the Chinese Communists fled into North Korea and based their operations there, aided 
by the communist North Korean government.     
 This arrangement had huge benefits for the ethnic Koreans in China after the 
Communists‟ eventual triumph in 1949.  The new government viewed the Korean minority as 
loyal and trustworthy members of the communist movement.  They were recognized as one of 
China‟s minzu, or component nationalities, and awarded limited self-government in their own 
autonomous prefecture, Yanbian, in 1952.
8
  Designation as a minority minzu is more than merely 
a formality; it entitles a group to privileges within the Chinese state, such as lower admission 
standards for universities, exemption from some birth control policies, and preferential hiring in 
government positions.  Thus the wartime alliance between the Chinese and Korean communists 
paid dividends far beyond the war itself. 
 One additional effect of this has been the ongoing association between the Korean 
Chinese and North Korea.  Conditions of life for the Korean Chinese have varied with the 
diplomatic relationship between China and North Korea.  The Chinese army fighting in the 
Korean War included over 60,000 Korean Chinese soldiers (Connor 2009, 45).  A fairly open 
border until the 1960s meant that Korean Chinese with family ties in North Korea could 
exchange visits regularly (Lankov 2004).  During this time the Korean Chinese enjoyed marked 
economic success, with standards of living and educational levels higher than even the Han 
(Colin 2003).  Unfortunately, with the political break between the Soviet Union and China in 
1959, the geographic location of the Korean Chinese and the Yanbian prefecture became an area 
of suspicion, with fortified borders and an increased military presence.  This situation escalated 
                                                 
8
 Of the total Korean Chinese population of 2 million, the 1990 census revealed that 62% of them live in Jilin 
Province, and 43% specifically within Jilin‟s Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture.  An additional 24% live in 
Heilongjiang Province and 12% live in Liaoning Province; only 3% live outside of the three Northeast provinces (Si 
Joong Kim 2003, 105) 
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further after 1967, when the Korean Chinese became targets during the Cultural Revolution.  
Mao Zedong‟s nephew Mao Yuanxin personally oversaw the imposition of martial law in 
Yanbian at this time, and assimilationist policies sought to eradicate the Korean language and 
cultural practices from the area (Colin 2003, footnote 13).  Many Korean Chinese fled to North 
Korea in this period, prompting the Chinese government to close the border entirely. 
 Overt persecution of Koreans in the Yanbian area continued until 1978.  Tensions 
remained high for another five years, until Deng Xiaoping personally visited the Yanbian area in 
1983 and called for a “swift and improved building up of the Yanbian Korean Autonomous 
Prefecture” (Colin 2003, quoting Li Delong 1991).  This translated into a revival of political 
autonomy and a concerted effort to bring economic development to the area.  While the Yanbian 
area had been among the most successful agricultural regions and produced a moderately high 
standard of living prior to the Cultural Revolution, by the end of the 1970s this had stagnated.  In 
the early 1980s especially, coastal China‟s urban economy was exploding and the Korean-
inhabited areas remained primarily agricultural.  A sense of relative poverty, combined with 
resentment over Cultural Revolution grievances, resulted in previously rare conflicts between 
Korean Chinese and Han.  Concern for the stability of the border region then undoubtedly 
motivated Deng‟s visit.  The result of that visit was an increase in industrial production in the 
area between 1980 and 1990, especially the launch of the Tumen River Development Project.   
 Yanbian‟s geographic position leaves it cut off from the sea by about 15 km, after an 
1860 treaty transferred control of the coastal area to Russia.
9
  The Yanbianese city of Hunchun 
then sits at the confluence of Russia, China, and North Korea, with the Tumen River serving as 
Yanbian‟s border to the south.  In light of Yanbian‟s continuing dependence on agriculture 
                                                 
9
 Ethnic Koreans were residing in this area at the time of the transfer; their experience is examined in more detail 
shortly. 
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through the 1980s, the Chinese government in 1990 proposed an infrastructure development 
project in the Tumen River area to be funded and administered by the United Nations 
Development Programme (Davies, 68).  A new port city built on Russian land would “channel 
cargo not only from China, Russia, and Mongolia to Japan and South Korea, but also from Japan 
and South Korea to Siberia, and from there to Europe via the trans-Siberian railway” (Freeman 
2010, 141).   Unfortunately, the project foundered on political instability and regime change in 
both Russia and North Korea.  Scaled back in 1996 to more modest (and vague) goal of “regional 
development,” the Tumen River Project was and remains the cornerstone of the central 
government‟s economic hopes for Yanbian (Freeman 2010).   
 As modest gains were made economically in Yanbian during the 1980s and 90s, the 
relationship with South Korea began to warm.  Relations with North Korea had cooled 
throughout the 1970s and 80s, as North Korea threw its lot in with the Soviet Union; the collapse 
of the Soviet Union in 1989 sent North Korea‟s economy into freefall (M. Connor 2009, 95).  
Ironically, this further chilled its relationship with China.  Famine through the 1990s left perhaps 
over 1 million North Koreans dead of starvation (Goodkind and West 2001)
10
 and raised the 
possibility of an exodus of hungry refugees in Northeast China.  The Chinese government had no 
desire to deal with a humanitarian crisis like this, and North Korea sought to hide the humiliating 
spectacle of its starving population (Scobell 2004).  It thus suited both governments to strictly 
enforce the closed border, leaving the Yanbian Koreans completely cut off from North Korea.  In 
this same timeframe, the 1988 Seoul Summer Olympics highlighted the economic success of 
South Korea and brought a new awareness of their South Korean connection to Yanbian.  When 
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 Goodkind and West address the uncertainty surrounding famine-related mortality rates; they survey the various 
reports on the death toll, which range from 200,000 up to 3 million, and eventually conclude that 1 million is a likely 
and reasonable estimate. 
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China thus established official diplomatic relations with South Korea in 1992, the pump was 
primed for a rush of inter-Korean exchange. 
 
2.2  Experience of Koreans in Soviet States 
 This background on the Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture and population takes 
for granted the continuation of the Koreans as a distinguishable minority in China.  However, it 
is worth questioning why this is so.  Why should they have maintained their language, traditional 
food and clothing styles, kinship patterns and social structures for 100 years while living within 
the political boundaries of another culture?  Minority assimilation has been a goal and reality for 
various peoples and states; this can be seen even within the global Korean population.  Large 
Korean minorities in Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) are now 
distinguishable only by phenotype and historical claim; Korean cultural practices and language 
have been replaced by local habits.  In comparing the experiences of the Korean minority in 
Russia and the former Soviet states with those of the Korean Chinese, it is clear that the 
preservation of Korean culture is not inevitable.   
 Roughly 100 Korean families were already living in the territory that China ceded to 
Russia in 1860.  As in the case of China, famine and drought had pushed more Koreans north 
into this land throughout the latter half of the nineteenth century, increasing the population to 
8,400 by 1870 (J.Y. Lee 2006, 3).  Japanese incursions motivated further migration in the early 
twentieth century.  Estimates put the Korean population in eastern Russia at 250,000 by the 
1920s (Songmoo Kho 1987, quoted in J.Y. Lee 2002, 120).  Again similar to the Korean 
experience in China, many Koreans in Soviet Russia joined the Bolsheviks to fight against the 
Japanese, earning them a favorable reputation within the Soviet Union.  Koreans were quickly 
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allowed to become Soviet citizens, and Korean lands were converted to collective farms.  Up to 
one-third had already adopted Russified names and joined the Orthodox Church by 1917, yet 
pressure increased on the Koreans to further assimilate.  Stalin especially felt that minority 
populations could not be trusted in border regions.  This culminated in the 1930s with forced 
deportations to Central Asian Soviet states.  The Korean population of Central Asia in 1939 then 
was 182,300; at the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1989, this number had reached 438,650 
(J.Y.  Lee 2002, 121).  As of 1999, the ethnically Korean populations of Russia and the former 
Soviet Central Asian states totaled over 470,000 (J.Y. Lee 2006, 5).  The former Soviet Koreans 
remain physically distinguishable in Central Asia and Russia; however, they do not speak the 
Korean language or wear Korean clothing even at ceremonial gatherings, have adopted Russian 
patronymic names, and have not sought political representation for themselves as a group (J.Y. 
Lee 2006).  Compared to the Korean Chinese, former Soviet Koreans have assimilated 
considerably. 
 
2.3  Chinese Minority Policy 
 The difference grows from the Chinese government‟s different approach to minorities.  
China currently divides its population into 56 minzu.  The largest minzu is the Han, with over 90% 
of China‟s total population (S.J. Kim, 2003).  Non-Han groups were defined and classified by the 
Chinese government through the 1950s and early 60s using a Stalinist model of ethnic 
identification.  Prior to that though, ethnic identities and majority/minority divisions in China 
were generally vaguer and more flexible.  As far back as the fourth century, “raw” minority 
groups could be “cooked” by Chinese culture and become accepted as Chinese themselves 
(Ebrey 1996).  Harrell (1995) discusses this approach as China‟s first civilizing project, closely 
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connected to Confucianism.  Minority groups, “inferior but potentially educable” (14) had the 
opportunity to learn and accept Confucian values and thereby become Chinese regardless of 
ethnic origin.  This cultural model of membership in the Chinese nation leaves open for debate 
the degree of change required by minority peoples.  Indeed, while it was rhetorically applied to 
anyone, the actual cases of peoples unquestionably “becoming” Chinese are rare.  This became 
especially apparent after the CCP began their minzu classification project and successfully 
rediscovered the many differences that marked minorities apart.   
 Brown (1996) addresses this issue and brings some clarity by differentiating between 
acculturation and assimilation.  Sinicization, the change that brought a group into the Chinese 
people, refers to a process of acculturation in which full assimilation and self-identification as 
Chinese was not necessary.  This distinction allows for the recognizable shift in behavior and 
identification that minorities underwent, without pretending that all groups were (or even could 
be) completely subsumed within the category of “Chinese.”  Minority groups in contact with the 
Han majority did adopt practices, beliefs, and knowledge from the Han, while the local Han in 
many cases took on practices of local peoples.  While hypothetically local behavior and beliefs 
could co-exist with the “proper” Confucian values, in most cases clear divisions remained.  
Brown notes that some Han officials actually sought to prevent prompt minority assimilation and 
preserve local cultures, to minimize conflict between Han settlers and long-time residents, 
predicting that too rapid a rate of change could create a backlash among local populations.   
 Brown suggests intermarriage with Han Chinese was the “short route” to identity change; 
to avert this too-rapid change, Aborigine Taiwanese were prohibited from intermarrying.  In 
other cases though, cross-cultural marriages were employed strategically by the Han as a tool for 
maintaining alliances.  Bulag (2002) raises the issue of heqin, or peace marriages, in which Han 
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Chinese women were given as brides to Inner Asian leaders.  Such marriages were on the one 
hand an act of submission by the Han, who, by using women‟s bodies as payments for peace, 
represented themselves as feminine.  On the other hand, within the Han Chinese territory these 
marriages were presented as a type of genetic conquest of the Mongol barbarian hordes, who 
would eventually join the Han in the great Chinese motherland.  It was these Han representations 
that held salience in China, and with the consolidation of Han power through the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries, it was these discourses that mattered. 
 Indeed, in many cases Han representations of minorities mattered more than the reality of 
minority existence (Crossley 2006).  Regardless of a group‟s held memories or current practices, 
Han discourses were typically accepted by those (Han) in power and minority groups had to 
work within the terms of those discourses.  The impact of accepting the Han definition was often 
a complete change in a non-Han group‟s identity.  This comes out strongly in Rigger‟s 1995 
discussion of Manchu ethnicity.  The Manchu people did not conceive of themselves as a 
cohesive group until after their contact with the Chinese in Chinese territory and their externally-
imposed definition by the Chinese.  The Manchu identity is thus a Chinese identity; that it is also 
a minority and non-Han identity does not negate its native character.   It appeared only through 
sharing space with the contrasting Han majority, through Han representations.   
 The lasting impacts of Han representations were keenly felt by minorities through the 
revolutionary period, as well.  As the Japanese attempted to win minority sympathy during 
WWII, Chinese Communists and Nationalists both made appeals to the various ethnicities in 
contested regions (W. Connor 1984).  The Chinese Communist Party especially, driven into the 
borderlands of southwest China and relying largely on the kindness of minority communities 
during the Long March (1934 – 36), found good reason to engage with minority histories.  
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Throughout the ensuing civil war the Communists vehemently denounced the legacy of Han 
oppression in minority areas and called for autonomy for China‟s ethnic minorities.  After the 
Communist triumph though, they realized that full independence for China‟s non-Han 
inhabitants would dismember much of China‟s territory.  The Communists instead offered 
cultural autonomy within sovereign Chinese territory.  This was a significant shift for two 
reasons.  First, it explicitly sought to end minority sinicization.  Second, and related, it was a 
fundamental change in the definition of the Chinese state. 
 Previously, peoples of all lineages could become Chinese through acculturation.  In the 
face of Western colonialism and a new discourse of territorially-bounded nation-states though, 
China‟s rulers could no longer rely on weakly-held borderlands to remain within Chinese control.  
The rise of nation-states necessitated firm borders.  This shift then, from an empire surrounded 
by borderlands to a nation as a bordered land (Leibold 2007), required China to become not a 
cultural concept but a territorial entity.   
 Within this new territorially-defined China then, controlling the representation of 
minorities became even more important.  For Chinese Communists to succeed in this redefinition, 
they had to convince a large and disparate group of people that, by virtue of their existing within 
Chinese space, they were unquestionably Chinese.  Kaup (2000) explicates how this process 
played out among the Zhuang.  The Zhuang are far and away China‟s largest ethnic minority, 
with over 16 million members.  They consist largely of scattered groups in Guangxi and Yunnan, 
most of whom did not consider themselves Zhuang prior to their official minzu classification as 
such.  The area currently designated as Zhuang was previously a mix of scattered communities, 
in which most villages had their own ethnic identity and were largely unaware of links with 
neighboring groups.  Kaup attributes this fragmentation to “the isolating mountainous terrain, 
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poor infrastructure, self-sufficient economies, and lack of a unified religious or political 
leadership” (47).  The new communist government‟s decision to classify them as one minzu did 
not reflect a unified ethnic reality but political necessity.  In order to consolidate political control 
over the region, it was expedient to label the area as one autonomous minority region and 
convince the many minorities there that they one shared history within the greater Chinese state 
– and further, a stake in the success of Guangxi as an autonomous minority region.  To build that 
history, the central government commissioned the recording of local folktales and customs and 
ethnographic studies of daily Zhuang life.  Educational initiatives succeeded in creating a 
Zhuang elite, capable of running the local government.  Ironically perhaps, the Zhuang party 
elite has since begun making demands on the central government for further minzu privileges to 
compensate for their oppression as a minority.   
 This example of an ethnic group arising in response to their creation as a category is 
echoed in many other instances.  Wu (1990) chronicles the lumping of various scattered groups 
into the minzu category of Bai.  He further observes how the benefits of minority minzu status led 
the Bai to self-consciously reject practices that might be too Chinese, instead embracing 
previously-neglected markers of Bai identity such as “ancestral worship, belief in geomancy, 
[and] the „Bai‟ house style” (9).  The definitions given by the Chinese state clearly influenced the 
understanding and performance of ethnic identity among the minorities.  This was apparent, and 
did not trouble the Chinese officials and scholars involved in the minzu identification project.  
They seem to have faith in their superior ability to understand the true position of the minorities.  
Fei Xiaotong (1981), himself an anthropologist assisting in the CCP‟s minzu classification 
system, reflects this belief in his description of the Chuanqing and Daur classification decisions.  
 The Chuanqing, despite many cultural differences, were ultimately classified as Han 
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people due to locally-forgotten common descent (thus again contradicting the cultural model of 
membership in the Chinese nation).  The Daur, on the other hand, received a separate minzu 
category because of their long independent existence, despite the Daurs‟ own opinion that they 
still belonged to the Mongol people.  Fei demonstrates the government‟s position that official 
scientific inquiry can enlighten people as to their true position within the Chinese state; 
discussing the ultimate decision on Daur classification, he writes “[t]he conclusions provided 
them with a correct understanding of their position and met with their general approval” (71).   
 Minzu classification was not always met with general approval though.  Cheung (1996) 
presents the case of the Ge, a self-proclaimed ethnic group in southeastern Guizhou, who have 
worked to gain official recognition as a minzu since 1956.  During the initial investigation of the 
Ge‟s claims, state officials reached an inconclusive decision and tentatively classified them as a 
sub-group of the Miao.  The Ge have steadily resisted this classification.  As part of their long-
term response, the Ge in the 1980s produced a 550-page reassessment challenging their 
classification; this was denied, but did provide a rallying point for the Ge.  Cheung highlights 
how group identities such as the Ge gain legitimacy through self-representation in narratives, or, 
in this case, are denied legitimacy because they are not permitted to represent themselves.  Their 
massive research project dismissed, the Ge began a campaign of civil disobedience, “defied their 
obligation to procure citizenship cards, withheld their grain tax, and pledged to defy birth-control 
and military subscription policies” (253).  Cheung interprets both the massive report and the 
resulting protests as attempts at self-representation, in defiance of their treatment as objects of 
state discourse.  Yet he simultaneously notes how the insult of Miao classification was felt 
primarily by Ge elites, who better knew the implications of the classification system and who 
stood to lose their positions as leaders of a distinct group.  I further add that this case 
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demonstrates how minorities – or would-be minorities – have accepted the legitimacy of the 
minzu classification system imposed on them by the Communist Party, and in doing so have 
strengthened its power over them. 
Minzu policy was thus clearly driven by the CCP‟s desire for political centralization.  
Using historical and ethnographic narratives to re-present minority groups to themselves, the 
new storylines emphasized that Chinese citizenship was not only natural but inevitable.  That this 
same processes occurred among the Korean minority is thus unsurprising.  Min-Dong Paul Lee 
(2005) traces the evolution of historical narratives of the Korean Chinese, finding contradictory 
themes in versions published by the central government and by the Korean Chinese themselves.  
The clearest differences lay in origin of the Koreans in China, and in the role the Korean 
minority played during the Japanese occupation of the 1930s and 40s.   Regarding the origin of 
the Korean minority, the official narrative appearing in the 1995 Dictionary of the History of 
China’s Minorities states that the Korean Chinese (Chaoxianzu) are a separate people from the 
Koreans of the Korean Peninsula, and that the Korean Chinese in fact originated in their 
currently-occupied area in the Northeast, then migrated back across the Yalu and Tumen rivers 
onto the Korean peninsula, only to return again in the nineteenth century (M.D.P. Lee 2005, 103).  
This in effect denies any lines of descent or blood linkages to either North or South Korea and 
roots the Korean Chinese primordially in China.   
Few Korean Chinese have taken issue with this claim, at least publicly; much more 
controversy surrounds the history of the revolutionary and civil war eras.  Official narratives 
stress that “[a]lthough Koreans were active participants of the anti-imperialist and anti-Japanese 
struggles, the ultimate victory was accomplished only through the guidance of the CCP” (M.D.P. 
Lee 2005, 107).  Koreans are relegated to mere pawns of the Chinese Communists.  Korean 
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Chinese scholars have denied this interpretation, arguing instead that the Koreans had an active 
and able resistance movement that joined and invigorated the small and weak branch of the CCP 
existing in the northeast in the early 1930s.  This insistence itself though shows an acceptance of 
the Korean Chinese positioning as properly within China; Korean Chinese historians argue not 
for a separate history, but for a more prominent Korean Chinese role in the origin myth of the 
Chinese state.  Complicating the debate is the controversial Minsaengdan massacre, in which 
Korean Chinese scholars claim that Chinese Communist leaders executed more than 1,000 
Korean Communists between 1932 and 1935, to consolidate control of the Korean population for 
Han Chinese cadres.  According to Lee, the Korean Chinese were in fact at that time so powerful 
within the resistance movement that the Han felt threatened to the point of murderous action 
(M.D.P. Lee 2005, 110).  This incident has never appeared in official histories of the area, and 
has only been discussed in Korean Chinese publications since the late 1980s. 
 Lee‟s overarching purpose is to highlight how ethnic identity is constructed and contested 
through historical narratives.  Following Stevan Harrell (1995), he argues that “[t]he question, 
then, is not whether national identities change, but how they are constructed and manipulated” 
and that “the main channel through which national identity is actively contended and negotiated 
is through historical narratives” (101).  Lee does not address diverse motives for why groups 
should choose to construct and manipulate national identities.  In cases such as the Ge, minority 
national identity has concrete material benefits at stake, and the object of the contestation is thus 
clear.  The Korean minzu is a different situation.  Korean Chinese were granted their own minzu, 
along with their own administrative region, as early as 1952 and with no agitation or pressing on 
their part.  There have been no calls for Yanbian independence; Korean Chinese are better-off 
economically than most of China‟s inhabitants; they continue to show higher rates of literacy and 
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tertiary education than their Han counterparts.  They appear to be a true model minority.  If 
anything, this discussion has sought to show that no such appearance is a natural, given, or pre-
ordained fact.  Identities need maintaining; the central government seeks to maintain the Korean 
Chinese identity as a docile model minority.  While Chinese minority policy was initially 
designed to incorporate restive and potentially independent groups into the Chinese state, the 
Korean Chinese were included as a more preventative strategy.   
  What they sought to prevent was the rise of a politically-minded ethnic nationalism in a 
sensitive border area.  Ethnic identity, already briefly questioned, is clearly a subjective belief 
rather than an objective fact.  The difference between ethnic identity and national identity, when 
national identity is understood as something other than political state-based citizenship, is 
ambiguous.  Brubaker (2009) discusses the problems of their overlapping meanings, arguing that 
“distinctions can be drawn on a number of dimensions, but these do not map neatly onto 
conventional distinctions between race, ethnicity, and nation” (26).  Membership in the ethnic 
group and national group can rely on patterns of behavior, claims of descent, territorial or social 
boundaries, economic practices, historical claims, and on.  Brubaker suggests that attempting to 
clearly define and separate ethnicity from nationhood is futile, and a better project would be 
examining how the use of the terms has evolved over time and across space.  Crossley (2006) 
addresses this issue similarly, concluding that „ethnicity‟ and „ethnic‟ are usually applied to 
distinguish a non-dominant group.  Hence ethnic nationalism is the nationalism of the minority; 
unqualified nationalism belongs to the majority nation within a state.   
 The Chinese state‟s approach to nationalism seeks to incorporate multiple understandings 
of ethnicity and nationhood and eventually subsume them within a larger idea of loyalty to the 
state.  Leibold (2007) traces how historical narratives sought to establish a common ancestry 
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between Han and minority groups.  Intermarriage became a frequent theme in these narratives, 
similar to the heqin peace marriages discussed by Bulag (2002).  Official histories constructed a 
vast and geographically-dispersed family tree that incorporated all of China‟s ethnic groups.   
Cultural diversity was acknowledged, but the various peoples of China were bound together 
through involuntary and immutable genetic legacy.  Thus descent-based understandings of group 
membership were fitted to the geographically-defined Chinese state, reinforcing and naturalizing 
its cohesion.   
 
2.4  Korean Chinese as a minority minzu 
 The Korean Chinese case is here again somewhat different.  Korean migration into the 
area occurred only within the last 150 years, within two or three generations of the present 
population.  The Korean Chinese retain clear and well-documented memories of this migration, 
tied up as it is with the traumatic experiences of war and famine.  Most Korean Chinese still have 
distant family in North Korea, and thanks to carefully preserved family records can prove that 
they have no Han blood (Colin 2003).  Hence their official history must go even further back to 
account for their origin on Chinese soil, their migration to the Korean peninsula and their 
eventual return migration north (M.D.P. Lee 2005).  I have found little discussion of this 
narrative in academic work on the Korean Chinese; most accepts that the Korean Chinese belong 
to the same family tree as the North and South Koreans, and that they moved into Chinese 
territory between 1850 and 1930 (J.Y. Lee 2002, S. J. Kim 2003, Colin 2003, Chang 2003).  
Despite the weakness of the Chinese state‟s historical claim on the Korean Chinese though, there 
has been no significant political unrest among the Korean Chinese disputing the state‟s authority.  
This is likely because negative effects of coming under Chinese state authority have been 
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minimal for the Korean Chinese minority; unlike other minority minzu, the Korean Chinese were 
not suddenly denied political authority or power that they had previously enjoyed.  Instead, 
because of the uncertain and menacing circumstances that brought the Korean minority under 
Chinese authority, the Korean Chinese minority early on accepted Chinese state rule as a not 
unfair price to pay for security and stability. 
 This is emphatically not to say that the Korean Chinese minority has acquiesced to Han 
Chinese cultural authority.  As Min-Dong Paul Lee (2005) emphasizes, ethnic assimilation 
remains the anathema of the Korean Chinese elite (105).  In my own interviews conducted 
among Korean Chinese labor migrants in the Seoul area during the summer of 2010, several 
informants claimed that the Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture remained the most purely 
Korean space in the world (interviews at Multicultural Village Center, July 2010).
11
  In separate 
interviews, four different Yanbian Koreans each claimed that Korean culture in the Republic of 
Korea (South Korea) had been corrupted over the last sixty years by materialism and consumer 
culture, mostly introduced through Westernization.  The Korean culture of the Yanbian area 
remained unaffected by external influences and thus uncorrupted.  Ironically though, three South 
Koreans interviewed together about their government-sponsored work with the Korean Chinese 
all complained that Yanbian Koreans had not evolved with the times and were 50 to 70 years 
behind South Korea in terms of development (interview, July 29, 2010).   
 These conflicting ideas of how to properly characterize Korean culture, at what point it 
can be fixed and defined, reflect decades of ideological indoctrination on both sides and stark 
differences in degrees of power and agency.  Unnoticed in isolation, these differences became 
readily apparent after diplomatic ties between China and South Korea were established in 1992 
and transnational migration began.  While these understandings could be read as successful tales 
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 All interviews were confidential; the names of interviewees are withheld by mutual agreement. 
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of indoctrination by the Chinese and South Korean states, it is more productive to approach the 
experience of migration from the overarching goal of state-building on the part of both sides.  In 
the next chapter, I will address how both states sought to employ Korean Chinese labor migrants 
as human capital that ultimately „belonged‟ to their respective governments.   
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CHAPTER 3:  
Korean Chinese Labor Migration into South Korea 
 
3.1  Labor Migration in Northeast Asia 
 Labor migration is a common practice in most of the world, with globalizing technologies 
dispersing migrants ever farther and faster.  But its prevalence should not be mistaken for ease.  
When people leave their home communities for years at a time, economic, social, political, and 
cultural systems are affected in both sending and receiving areas.  Migration entails a range of 
decisions and possibilities, is influenced by local conditions and global hierarchies, and itself can 
reinforce, alter, or push back against the conditions surrounding it.  As mentioned in the first 
chapter, East Asian governments have tended to treat migration and especially ethnic return 
migration as an opportunity for co-ethnics to contribute to the state; the people become sources 
of human capital contributing to both the sending and receiving areas (Skrentny et al 2009).  This 
is especially true in the Korean Chinese case.  Remittances have been providing important 
sources of revenue for Yanbian locals since migration to South Korea began in the early 1990s, 
but the local government was slow to recognize this.  The South Korean government, by contrast, 
made explicit from the beginning that they viewed the Korean Chinese migrants as a resource for 
the South Korean state.  This was buttressed by a legal system established specifically to receive 
co-ethnic labor migrants.  The Korean Chinese initially accepted the status assigned to them by 
both the Chinese and South Korean governments, as sources of remittances and labor 
respectively.  Other expectations or desires on their part seemed overshadowed by the 
opportunity to earn wages many times higher than available at home.   
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But over the two decades since labor migration began, Korean Chinese have begun to 
demand more than simple monetary compensation for the disruptions they endure to migrate.  
This new sense of entitlement is closely tied up with an emerging identity apart from the South 
Koreans, by which the Korean Chinese no longer view themselves as distant „country cousins‟ 
but as their own separate people deserving of rights and treatment equal to any other person or 
any other Korean, regardless of geographic origin.   
 
China‟s reform period began in earnest in the 1980s, with changes in the hukou 
(household registration) system.  These reforms allowed rural people to migrate within China, 
without official pre-approval, for the first time since 1958.  An estimated 20% of China‟s rural 
workforce had thus migrated to cities by 2003, seeking non-agricultural work and a higher 
standard of living (Zhan 2005, 14).  However, minority ethnic groups to a large extent did not 
participate in this migration (Zhan 2005, 20).   
The Korean minority has shown lower rates of out-migration than the Han Chinese in 
China overall, but higher than most other ethnic minority groups.  Rather, rural-to-urban 
migration has appeared within Northeast China, with rural Koreans giving up agricultural 
livelihoods for low-skilled work in small local towns and cities.  This is due in part to the 
benefits of the local hukou system, but also to cultural and linguistic traditions that 
disenfranchise them within the larger Chinese state (Chang 2003, 40).  But as Si Joong Kim 
documents, a significant number of Korean Chinese have found a niche in working for South 
Korean companies in Chinese cities; “that is, ethnic Korean people have become employees of 
enterprises with Korean investment or of branch offices of Korean companies in China, as 
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translators, regular workers, or occasionally business partners” (S.J. Kim 2003, 117).  Thus rural-
to-urban migration within China has provided some benefits to the Korean minority.
12
 
 Compared to internal migration though, the opportunity to migrate to South Korea has 
proven a much larger draw for the Korean Chinese.  After China and South Korea established 
diplomatic relations in 1992, South Korea gradually developed a special immigration policy for 
the ethnic Korean Chinese (N.H.J. Kim 2008).  This policy initially allowed Korean Chinese to 
come to South Korea as “industrial trainees” and remain for three years with guaranteed 
employment.  The industrial trainee program created a large pool of cheap labor available to 
South Korean employers, with the added benefits that the immigrants spoke Korean yet remained 
unprotected by South Korean labor laws.  Perhaps unsurprisingly, this resulted in “intense 
exploitation, discrimination, and abuse” for the migrants (Lim 2010, 55).  Nonetheless, this 
opportunity drew as many as 250,000 Korean Chinese laborers by 2006 (Seol and Skrentny 2009, 
152).   
 
3.2  South Korean immigration policy development 
The South Korean immigration policy was designed around the idea of transational 
ethnicity.  South Korea was not an immigrant-receiving nation until the late 1980s, when 
democratic reforms allowed for greater political stability and rapid economic development at 
home.  Nora Hui-Jung Kim (2008) identifies three stages of development in South Korean 
immigration policy.  The first stage, running roughly from 1987 to 1997, was characterized by 
the lack of a cohesive national immigration policy.  Instead, the government allowed South 
Korean businesses to „sponsor‟ inexpensive foreign workers as needed.  This evolved by 1992 
into the industrial trainee system (ITS).  Kim emphasizes that “ITS was not governmental policy, 
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 A more detailed discussion of the Korean migratory experience within China follows later in the chapter. 
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but a recruitment scheme managed by a private interest group representing economic liberals, the 
Korean Federation of Small and Medium Businesses” (586).  Importantly, because the foreign 
workers were considered “trainees” rather than immigrants, they had no legal protection for their 
labor rights.  Further, under ITS there was no stated preference for ethnic Koreans.  South 
Korean businesses turned voluntarily to ethnic Koreans in China, primarily because of the shared 
language and prejudice against non-Koreans.   
 The second stage of South Korean immigration policy began in 1997 during the Asian 
financial crisis.  South Korean industry was hard-hit and production slowed, decreasing the need 
for factory labor.  In search of foreign investment and high-skilled workers to reinvigorate the 
economy, the South Korean business lobby promoted the passage of the Overseas Koreans Act.  
This act granted special rights and privileges to anyone who had ever been a Korean citizen and 
their descendents, essentially granting them full citizenship barring voting rights.  However, the 
definition of a Korean citizen was limited to citizenship within the Republic of Korea – a state 
that has only existed since 1948.  Koreans who left before 1948, including the entire Korean 
Chinese population, were excluded from the legal Korean nation in an attempt to prevent a flood 
of unskilled laborers from entering the country (N.H.J. Kim 2008, 588).   
Yet the new policies did not abolish the industrial trainee system, leaving Korean Chinese 
available if and when the South Korean economy should recover and demand cheap labor again.  
This prompted some reaction from labor rights groups and migrant advocacy organizations.  
Eventually, with Supreme Court intervention and extensive negotiations between liberal and 
conservative politicians, immigration policy was again overhauled in 2003.  The industrial 
trainee program was gradually abolished by 2007 and replaced by a more liberal “employment 
permit system” which granted basic labor rights to all foreign workers.  Ironically perhaps, given 
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its stated intention of bringing South Korean immigration law in line with international human 
rights standards, this new system enshrined ethnic preference even more solidly than before.  
Under the new regulations, “Special Work Permits” and a new type of visa (H-2) became 
available to the Korean Chinese (N.H.J. Kim 2008, 591).  However, the employment permit 
system created even more generous visas and work permits for ethnic Korean citizens of Japan 
and the U.S., thereby angering many Korean Chinese.   
 Overtly different treatment for ethnic Koreans of various citizenships has two broader 
implications for the global Korean population.  It shows firstly that the South Korean state 
continues to employ descent-based understandings of Korean identity; far from the liberal ideal 
of equality for all, Korean heritage continues to grant special privileges in the eyes of the state.  
Secondly though, it reveals the position of power that the South Korean state holds with respect 
to Korean peoples abroad.  The local Yanbian government has no ethnic immigration policy, and 
if it did, it would be unlikely to affect many Koreans from abroad.  It is instead South Korea, 
with a higher economic position in the global hierarchy, which has the power to order and rank 
degrees of global Koreans.   
 
3.3  Chinese state interventions 
The South Korean government has thus selectively deployed definitions of the Korean 
nation to either bring in or exclude the Korean Chinese population as the South Korean economy 
requires.  The Chinese government too has attempted to employ the Korean aspects of the 
Korean Chinese population for their political and economic ends.  Initially hesitant about the 
political repercussions of trans-national migration, early migrants out the Yanbian area were 
screened carefully.  There was some concern about their loyalties to China; the Chinese 
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government even formally protested an early South Korean suggestion to offer Korean Chinese 
people permanent resident status (Seol and Skrentny 2009, 153).
13
  However, no political 
agitation has been reported.  On the contrary, labor migration to South Korea has had the doubly-
beneficial impacts (from the Chinese state‟s perspective) of strengthening a geographically 
Chinese understanding of the Korean Chinese identity while also bringing in unprecedented cash 
flows. 
 The flow of Korean Chinese migrants has been channeled to South Korea by the shared 
sense of Koreanness.  But of course, the motivation for migrating in the first place is the 
opportunity to earn a much higher return on one‟s labor in South Korea than in Yanbian.  Ethnic 
Korean Chinese in South Korea could “earn in one month a sum equivalent to several years‟ 
average income in Yanbian” (Luovo 2009, 432).  Wang Bae Kim (2004) reports that Korean 
Chinese migrants in South Korea earn on average 1 million won ($800) per month, which is “six 
or seven times higher than the average income in Yanbian, which is about $110 per month” 
(326).   In 2001, this resulted in remittances sent to Yanbian of over $300 million, more than 
total income in Yanbian that year of $208 million (D.S. Kim and J.M. Kim 2005, 95).  By 2007, 
the Yanbian government reported that remittances had reached one billion U.S. dollars (Luova 
2008, 34).  As in many other cases, these remittances were spent on consumption.  Often though 
at least part of the remittances were saved for the migrant to use upon return.  As Louvna (2009) 
describes, “many returnee migrants operated small businesses such as restaurants, karaoke bars, 
or hair-dressing salons, since to do so did not necessarily require a large investment, but very few 
established a larger business or invested in production” (439).   
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 This suggestion produced a massive backlash within South Korea too, and never made it even as far as a 
legislative proposal there. 
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Such astoundingly high levels of remittances can be attributed at least partly to an 
aggressive Chinese government policy.  Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, the national, 
provincial, and prefectural governments enacted a series of policies intending to “ensure, by 
various means, the proper conduct of migrants before, during and after migration…” with the 
particular goal of “sustain[ing] migrants‟ links with their home region in order to ensure a steady 
flow of remittances to Yanbian” (Luova 2008, 40).  These policies included required courses on 
citizenship and patriotism prior to migration, visits by Chinese government officials to migrants 
overseas and to their families back home, and assigning certain migrants to carry out 
“ideological work” among their fellow migrants abroad.  Thus the government sought to turn 
large-scale out-migration into a local development strategy. 
 The Yanbian government saw development opportunities not only in sending labor to 
South Korea, but in receiving foreign investment from South Korea and Korean communities in 
the U.S. and Canada.  This was accomplished by playing up the Koreanness of the area.  For 
example, 1992 saw the first-ever Korean Cultural Festival in Yanbian, with over three hundred 
ethnic Korean businesspeople attending as guests from abroad (Luova 2009, 434).  The Yanbian 
government has also sought to promote tourism to the Mount Baekdu area, not only for its scenic 
beauty but also for its fabled location as the birthplace of the Korean race.
14
  Their efforts have 
resulted in over 1.7 million domestic Chinese tourists and over 100,000 South Korean tourists 
annually since 2000 (Greater Tumen Initiative 2011).  The Yanbian government has also sought 
to burnish their Korean cultural credentials by rebuilding several traditional Korean villages and 
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 According to Korean legend, the son of God wanted to live in Korea, and so descended to Mt. Baekdu.  There he 
turned a bear into a woman, they married and their son Tangun established the first Korean kingdom of Joseon.  Mt. 
Baekdu continues to play a huge role in the Korean imagination; in North Korean narratives, Kim Il-Sung defeated 
the Japanese on the mountain, and his son Kim Jong-Il was reportedly born there.  Recent volcanic activity on the 
mountain (frequent tremors since 2002, and a 6.9 magnitude earthquake in February 2011) has created widespread 
concern about an upcoming eruption, even prompting a meeting of North and South Korean geologists in March 
(http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2011/03/30/2011033000422.html). 
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funding exhibitions on local Korean folk customs (Luovna 2007).  These efforts seem to have 
had resounding success.  According to South Korean statistics, Yanbian has received over $6 
billion in direct investment from South Korea between 1992 and 2002 (S.J. Kim 2003, 113).  The 
majority of investment coming into Yanbian from sources other than North and South Korea also 
comes from ethnic Koreans elsewhere (Luovna 2007).   The local Korean Chinese government 
then approaches the global Korean community in the same way as the South Korean government 
– the people are a resource for the state, rather than the state existing to assist and protect the 
people. 
 
3.4  Emboldening labor migrants in South Korea 
 In similar ways then, the South Korean and Chinese governments seek to cash in on the 
migratory decisions of the Korean Chinese.  But both governmental strategies rely on the 
durability of the Korean Chinese dual identity.  Without an active Korean identity, the Korean 
Chinese could just as well migrate to Chinese cities, denying South Korean businesses the cheap 
labor they have come to expect.  Without a compelling bond to China, these same migrants 
might settle permanently in South Korea, keeping their remittances and their investment capital 
for themselves.  Through the 1990s these strategies held.  But it remained an uncomfortable 
situation, in which Korean Chinese were constantly reminded of their lower status in the Korean 
ethnic hierarchy through both legal and illegal discrimination in South Korea.  Meanwhile a 
fledgling foreign labor rights movement began in South Korea, headed up by South and 
Southeast Asian workers who faced even higher barriers.  The Korean Chinese were initially 
excluded from this movement.  But by the early- to mid-2000s, Korean Chinese labor migrants 
began to identify more strongly with other foreign laborers in South Korea.  This led them to re-
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conceptualize their own status in South Korea, shifting from being co-ethnics in the motherland 
to just one more group of foreigners. 
 Officially-documented unskilled foreign workers in South Korea increased from near-
zero in 1987 to around 350,000 in 2002 (W.B. Kim 2004, 321).  The majority were Korean 
Chinese, arriving as part of the industrial trainee system with temporary non-renewable trainee 
visas and no path to citizenship.  They further had no labor rights and were ineligible for the 
public health, education, or social benefits that extend to South Korean citizens and non-„trainee‟ 
foreigners in South Korea.  This led to widespread labor abuses.  Delayed wage payment, 
extremely long hours, unsafe conditions with no accident insurance, and sudden layoffs without 
final payment were common complaints (W.B. Kim 2004, 326).  Public discourse on these issues 
began in 1995, when thirteen Nepali migrant workers in South Korea staged a dramatic protest at 
the symbolic Myeongdong Cathedral in Seoul (N.H.J. Kim 2009, 683; discussed also in Lim 
2010, 55).
15
  This sparked the creating of several South Korean migrant worker advocacy NGOs 
and introduced a politically liberal discourse of universal rights into the previously economically 
liberal approach to immigration policy.   
 The original focus of the migrant labor advocacy movement was on South and Southeast 
Asian migrants.  Easily distinguishable physically and typically less than proficient in the Korean 
language, they faced much greater discrimination and harassment in all aspects of their daily 
lives in Korea (Kang 1996).  However, this clear demarcation of difference also assisted in 
bonding them together to push back against South Korean discrimination.  The Korean Chinese 
were not originally part of the labor rights movement, despite their majority share of the total 
foreign labor population.  This can be partly attributed to the legal separation of the Korean 
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 Myeongdong Cathedral served as a center for the resistance movement during Japanese occupation, openly 
defying the Japanese by offering protection to resistance fighters on humanitarian grounds. 
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Chinese from other foreign workers, but on a larger scale it demonstrates the early identification 
of Korean Chinese with the South Korean population and not with the non-Korean workers 
occupying the same social and economic position.  The Korean Chinese workers then remained 
somewhere between the domestic and the foreign.  It was unclear if their interests would be 
better served through closer alignment with their fellow non-citizen workers or through pushing 
for full equality as Koreans. 
 Certainly any attempt to achieve parity with South Koreans – or Korean Americans, or 
Korean Japanese – would have been hindered by the South Koreans‟ rejection of ethnic equality.  
The South Korean population, especially employers, did not consider the Korean Chinese true 
co-ethnics.  As Seol and Skrentny (2009) report, “Korean citizens do indicate a preference for 
Joseonjok [Korean Chinese] to other foreigners, but it seems clear that they usually treat them as 
just that – foreigners – and employers sometimes have negative attitudes towards them that may 
go beyond what they harbor towards other foreigners” (158).  This reflects employers‟ 
appreciation for the linguistic compatibility and relatively low cost of labor that Korean Chinese 
bring to factory jobs, but also the Korean Chinese‟ ability to move more freely in the labor 
market and thus their higher rates of employment turnover.  Surveys beyond the labor sector 
show similar sentiments among South Koreans; compared to Korean Americans, the Korean 
Chinese were much less likely to be called dongpo, which literally translates to “Korean citizen 
abroad” (Seol and Skrentny 2009, 160).  Apparently some discrepancies existed between the 
ethnic-brethren discourse of South Korean policy-makers and the population at large. 
 The Korean Chinese, who had generally arrived in South Korea understanding 
themselves to be members of the greater Korean nation, found themselves marginalized by South 
Koreans and sharing instead the experiences of foreigners.  Eventually accepting the status quo, 
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Korean Chinese workers joined the foreign workers‟ labor rights movement by the late 1990s.  
While not an extremely active or visible element, they lent critical numbers to this push and 
helped to highlight the widespread nature of human rights abuses experienced by foreign 
workers in South Korea (Kang 1996).  Interestingly then, the South Korean Ministry of Justice 
took concrete steps in 2003 to ease entry and visa requirements for Korean Chinese – but no 
other group (Y.W. Lee 2004, 9).  This gesture may have been intended to draw the Korean 
Chinese away from the foreign labor rights movement, but if so was fairly ineffective.  Korean 
Chinese workers continue to swell the ranks of labor protests and pro-union movements in South 
Korea. 
 
3.5  Impacts on Sending Areas 
 The Korean Chinese and South Koreans thus continue to negotiate the ways that co-
ethnicity can manifest in labor relations.  The results of this negotiation are felt far beyond the 
workplace though, and even beyond the reach of South Korean policy.  The economic fortunes 
of Korean Chinese migrant workers are closely tied to the future of the Korean Chinese 
population in China.  Successful out-migration seems almost antithetical to successful 
development in Yanbian.  And indeed, demographic data shows that the ethnic Korean 
population in Yanbian is waning, decreasing from a peak population of 860,000 in 1995 to a 
2000 population of 842,000 (S.J. Kim 2003, 115).  This is the result of three trends in the 
population: increasing dispersion, declining birthrates, and rapid aging.   
 Although intra-national migration has not proven an extremely lucrative economic 
strategy for the Korean Chinese thus far, there is some evidence that this is changing – at least in 
terms of departure from agricultural areas in Yanbian.  Zai Liang and Kerry Dohm (2006) reveal 
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that when looking only at the Jilin provincial population, the Korean minority has actually shown 
a higher participation rate in both interprovincial and intra-provincial migration than has the Han 
population in the area.  However, internal migration among the ethnic Koreans has shown a more 
limited pattern of dispersion than their Han counterparts; rates of interprovincial migration were 
similar (1.05% for Han and 1.42% for Korean), while Koreans were much more likely to migrate 
within Jilin province (5.95% of Koreans were intra-provincial migrants, only 2.42% of Han; 
Liang and Dohm 2006, 9 – 10).  This reflects a much lower initial rate of urbanization in the 
Yanbian area, where many of the internal migrants originated.  Further, the majority of Korean 
interprovincial migrants went to the neighboring provinces of Heilongjiang and Liaoning, both 
of which have substantial Korean minorities.  Han migrants from Jilin were more likely to 
choose farther-flung Han areas like Beijing.   
The higher rates of less geographically diverse migration reflect the benefits of remaining 
within Korean minority communities.  Harris Kim (2003) addresses this phenomenon through 
the framework of the ethnic enclave economies, specifically looking at Yanbian.  His research 
supports a positive interpretation of ethnically-based economic activity; “statistical results 
provide evidence that working for a co-ethnic employer in the private sector has non-trivial 
earning advantages” (H. Kim 2003, 823).  This is discussed too by Fang Gao (2009), who 
explores the role of minority ethnic education in Yanbian.  Those students who attended ethnic 
Korean schools and did not study the Chinese language felt themselves to be at a disadvantage in 
the larger Chinese economy.  Doo-Sub Kim and Jung Min Kim (2005) further reiterate this point, 
claiming that “the Korean language does not work advantageously to the upward mobility of 
Koreans in Chinese mainstream society.  Koreans are limited in work and promotion as an ethnic 
minority” (93).  Koreans face difficulties in trying to move beyond their ethnic networks, 
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restricting their internal migration patterns to areas with co-ethnics and thereby reinforcing the 
closed circuit of minority populations. 
Divisions between Han and Korean ethnic groups appear also in their fertility and aging 
patterns.  Interestingly, ethnic Korean Chinese demographic patterns reflect and amplify 
characteristics of the South Korean population.  The Korean Chinese minority has already 
reached below-replacement fertility rates.  South Korea too has lowest-low fertility, recording 
the lowest in the world in 2005.  Within South Korea this is attributed to strong Korean cultural 
values that are incompatible with “socioeconomic changes such as the rising cost of children, 
changing labor market conditions, and increasing female labor force participation” (Suzuki 2008, 
31).
16
   Since the Korean Chinese fertility decline has coincided with the opening of diplomatic 
channels between China and South Korea and new economic development, similar factors may 
be at play in Yanbian (D.S. Kim and J.M. Kim 2005, 88).
17
  Rapid aging, too, is becoming an 
issue in South Korea; while 8% of the population was over age 65 in 2007, that proportion 
should reach 34% by 2050 (B.J. Kim and Torres-Gil 2009, 81).  Again reflecting the South 
Korean trend, Doo Sub Kim and Jung Min Kim (2005) report that “the aging trend of the 
Yanbian Korean population is even speedier than South Korea” (88).   
 One important result of these demographic trends has been the decline of ethnic 
education in the Yanbian area.  Korean Chinese, again similar to South Koreans and most other 
overseas Korean populations, have markedly high levels of educational attainment.  Fang Gao 
(2009) discusses this, noting that in China, among all 56 ethnic groups including the Han, “the 
Korean minority is widely believed to have the highest level of college attendance and lowest 
level of illiteracy… while also sustaining a strong ethnic identity” (17).  However, due to falling 
                                                 
16
 South Korean fertility patterns will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 4. 
17
 Another important factor affecting Korean Chinese fertility rates has been the rapid out-flux of reproductive-age 
women to South Korea for marriage; this too will be addressed in the following chapter. 
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enrollment, ethnic Korean schools have been forced to close.  Si Joong Kim (2003) reports that 
“the number of ethnic Korean elementary schools in Yanbian Prefecture decreased from 419 in 
1985 to 177 in 1995, and the number of ethnic Korean middle and high schools decreased from 
118 in 1985 to 49 in 1995” (121).   More recent statistics show that new enrollments in ethnic 
Korean schools in Yanbian in 2000 were 45.2% of the new enrollments reported in 1996 (D.S. 
Kim and J.M. Kim 2005).  These numbers, undoubtedly high, should be seen as a reflection of a 
number of factors.  Obviously, the sharp decline in birthrates since 1990 has reduced the total 
number of children.  But Gao (2009), Doo Sub Kim and Jung Min Kim (2005), and Si Joong 
Kim (2003) all stress that significant numbers of ethnic Korean Chinese children are being 
enrolled in either Han or mixed-ethnic schools in the region.  Fluency in Chinese language is 
now accepted as a vital skill for ethnic Koreans.  Thus far, no evidence suggests that the Korean 
language is being lost as a result.  Korean remains the first language, used in most homes and 
businesses in the Yanbian area.  But a 2003 law mandating the use of Korean language alongside 
Chinese in all Yanbian government capacities reveals a degree of linguistic insecurity (D.S. Kim 
and J.M. Kim 2005, 14).  Other subject matter taught in ethnic Korean schools though, such as 
Korean history and traditional Korean cooking and crafts, may be even more at risk. 
Additionally, migration has altered family structures and resulted in the dispersion of 
families in the Yanbian area.  In Tumen City, for example, 63.8% of elementary students report 
having one parent overseas (D.S. Kim and J.M. Kim 2005, 94).  How this will affect the social 
structure of the Korean Chinese population is unclear.  While most of these migrants initially 
intend to return after making their fortunes, thus far a significant portion has not come back.  
This has prompted researchers such as Doo Sub Kim and Jung Min Kim (2005, 96) to conclude 
that “social integration and cultural identity are in the process of weakening” and “the socio-
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demographic basis of the Yanbian autonomous prefecture [by 2020] will be seriously threatened.”  
The demographic composition of large-scale out-migration will thus have lasting consequences 
for the Yanbian population.   
 
3.6  The Future of Yanbian? 
 These mournful discussions foretelling the decline of Korean society in China assume a 
clear and declinable Korean identity as their subject.  But defining what constitutes Koreanness 
proves problematic.  In comparing the Korean features of the Korean Chinese and South Korean 
populations, important differences are readily apparent.  Linguistic changes during 60 years of 
separation have caused significant problems for Korean Chinese employees of South Korean 
companies in China, especially those using technical vocabularies (S.J. Kim 2003, 117).  Gender 
expectations are also widely divergent.  Among the Korean Chinese, gender roles have evolved 
towards greater equality, but the South Koreans maintain highly patriarchal ideas of chastity, 
household division of labor, and subservience to elders.  These differences have caused 
widespread problems in transnational marriages between Korean Chinese women and South 
Korean men, as will be discussed in the next chapter.  Problematic differences in workplace 
practices have been recognized as an issue in labor migration as well, prompting the Yanbian 
prefectural government to set up several migrant training centers for ethnic Koreans in Yanbian.  
These training centers provide pre-migration education on South Korean manners, ethics, and 
workplace regulations (Luova 2008, 39).   
 Thus fears about the erasure of Koreanness ignore the adaptive and evolutionary nature 
of cultural traits.  Differences and fragmentation exist within ethnic groups across space and 
especially across national boundaries.  The appearance of a substantive Chicano/a identity in the 
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U.S. is a good example of this, whereby an ethnic sub-group experienced unique historical 
events which crafted a new collective identity, albeit one not severed from the older and more 
inclusive ethnic identity (Allatson 2007, 61).  This possibility is hinted at in discussions of a 
proper name for the ethnically Korean Chinese.  Their official name in China is Chaoxianzu 
(朝鲜族), which implies that they are a Chinese nationality group of Korean descent.  Their most 
frequent designation in South Korea is Joseonjok (조선족), meaning roughly the same thing, a 
Chinese person of Korean heritage (Choi 2006, 1).  However, in a meeting this summer with a 
legal advisor to the South Korean National Assembly on Korean Chinese affairs, I was informed 
that Joseonjok is now considered a discriminatory term in South Korea because it negates the 
fundamental Koreanness of the Korean Chinese (personal interview, July 15, 2010).  Newly 
acceptable terms include Jungguk dongpo (중국 동포), meaning an overseas Korean residing in 
China, or the blander Yanbian salam (연볜 사람), meaning literally a person from Yanbian.  
This debate, instigated primarily by Korean Chinese advocating for labor rights in South Korea, 
reveals a growing awareness of nuance in discussions of Korean ethnic membership.   
Some scholars, too, have recognized new possibilities for the Korean Chinese.  Si Joong 
Kim (2003) suggests that increasing economic ties between South Korea and China will open 
future opportunities for the Korean Chinese in China.  „Koreatowns‟ in major Chinese cities are 
appearing to cater to growing Korean populations; one Korean suburb of Beijing has as many as 
10,000 residents (124).  Kim and Kim (2005) point out that these ethnic concentrations in more 
economically developed areas can create vibrate cultural communities (97).  While rural 
depopulation in Yanbian continues apace, formerly rural people are engaging in new and better-
paid work elsewhere.  Activities by “overseas Korean” support groups, aiming to facilitate social 
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and economic ties within the Korean diaspora, have increased notably since the 1990s (Luova 
2009).   
 A final point to be made regarding the future of the ethnic Korean minority in China is 
the absolute immutability of China‟s minority policy.  As discussed in Chapter 2, 
anthropological studies conducted throughout the 1950s resulted in the official recognition of 56 
ethnic groups within China.  Despite numerous other groups petitioning for recognition and some 
recognized groups being in fact contesting their minority status, the Chinese government has 
declined any requests for redress (Harrell 1990, Kaup 2000).  Even very dramatic demographic 
fluctuations seem unlikely to alter the status of the Koreans as a minority group or the 
designation of Yanbian as a minority autonomous prefecture.  This is reinforced too by the 
ongoing investment in the Tumen River Development Project.  China is committed to 
maintaining its multinational state designation.   
 The ethnic Korean minority then is not necessarily facing annihilation, but drastic 
socioeconomic and geographic change.  Official development strategies having failed, Korean 
inhabitants of the Yanbian prefecture have found in migration their chance to participate in the 
global economy.  Their ethnic heritage has proven detrimental to joining China‟s urban 
development, but has simultaneously opened new doors vis-à-vis their links to South Korea.  Yet 
the opportunities provided by migration have had serious demographic impacts; a rapid decline 
in fertility and accelerating aging of the Korean Yanbian population call into question its long-
term viability. These impacts are not only the result of out-bound labor migration though, but 
also and as importantly the marriage migration of large numbers of Korean Chinese women to 
South Korea. 
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CHAPTER 4: 
Korean Chinese Marriage Migration into South Korea 
 
Between 1990 and 2005, almost 110,000 Korean Chinese women came to South Korea 
for marriage to South Korean men (J.Y. Lee 2008, 111).   Given the total Korean Chinese 
population of roughly 2 million, this is a huge percentage.  The history and conditions that led to 
this figure are closely tied to the background of Korean Chinese labor migration.  Thus the 
political divisions that created a Korean Chinese population, the Chinese policies that sought to 
maintain Korean culture within China, the uneven economic geographies and shifting diplomatic 
relationships of northeastern Asia all bear on the marriage decisions made by Korean Chinese 
women.  Another important factor though is the socio-demographic profile of the South Korean 
state.   Every state demands reproductive labor for the biological, social, and cultural 
reproduction of the nation.  However, most states can meet that demand from within their own 
populations.  This is not true of South Korea.  Extremely low fertility in conjunction with a 
strangely disproportionate gender ratio at birth has created an unsustainable and somewhat 
warped demographic profile for the country.  Accounting for this requires consideration of the 
recent history of the South Korean state. 
 
4.1  A South Korean Demography 
 Since the end of the Second World War South Korea has undergone rapid social, political, 
and economic transformations.  Extreme deprivation after the Korean War led to a series of 
military dictatorships and coups.  Rapid industrialization through the 1970s and 80s increased 
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standards of living and brought South Korea in closer contact with Western countries.  However, 
South Korea has not precisely followed the Western model of economic development.  South 
Korea remains a Confucian society, with a strong cultural preference for men over women.  In 
terms of economic effects, this has prevented women from entering the workforce on a large 
scale.  In 2009 the proportion of working-age women in the South Korean workforce actually fell 
to 49.2% (Chosun Ilbo 2010a).  According to much demographic theory (cf. Caldwell 2009), this 
implies that the opportunity cost of reproduction is low, therefore encouraging fertility.  Yet in 
2009 South Korea also registered the world‟s second-lowest birthrate of 1.22, just behind Bosnia 
and Herzegovina‟s 1.21 (BBC 2010).  This 1.22 is even an improvement over the nation‟s all-
time low in 2005, with a TFR of 1.08 (Suzuki 2008, 30).  These extremely low numbers qualify 
the country‟s demographic profile as “lowest-low” fertility rates.  Lowest-low patterns appear 
when total fertility rates drop below 1.3 (Billari and Kohler 2004, 161); when this occurs, a 
population risks rapid and perhaps irrecoverable decline.  This lowest-low behavior has shown a 
correlation with more traditional family patterns.  Delayed marriage, low levels of extra-marital 
fertility, late departure from the parental home, and low frequency of divorce all are predictors 
for lowest-low fertility.  Traditional gender roles also contribute to lowest-low fertility in modern 
capitalist society, because women are less willing to shoulder the double burden of paid labor 
and unpaid domestic work; when dual-income households become the norm without efforts at 
ameliorating domestic inequality, birthrates decline.  Scandinavian countries have successfully 
countered this effect by instituting a public childcare system and encouraging gender equality in 
all spheres, which did result in a rising birthrate through the 1990s (Suzuki 2009).  South Korea, 
however, has moved towards the dual-income domestic model without addressing gender 
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equality on a significant scale.  Not unique to South Korea though, these behaviors are also 
characteristic of other Confucian societies like China, Japan, and Taiwan.   
 South Korea‟s demographic profile has also been distorted by a large sex-ratio imbalance.  
Rapidly adopting computer-based technologies since the 1970s, pre-natal ultrasounds allowed 
South Korean parents to learn a fetus‟s sex prior to birth.  Again with Confucian preference for 
boys still strong, sex-selective abortion has resulted in a widely skewed birthrate between the 
sexes.  This peaked in 1990 at 116.5 boys born per 100 girls (Choe 2007) and remained above 
114 throughout the early 1990s (Guilmoto 2007, 2).  This gender imbalance has appeared not 
only in South Korea but in China, India, and several Southwest Asian nations as well.  However, 
the South Korean government was initially the only one to address gender-selective abortion at 
the national scale.  The government attempted to increase public awareness and sensitivity to the 
issue using slogan campaigns during the 1980s.  As of 1987, doctors were no longer allowed to 
inform expecting parents of their fetus‟s sex.  These changes have affected the skewed-sex 
birthrate only gradually; a decline was not seen until 2002, and by 2006 the rate had dropped to 
107.4 (Choe 2007).  A return to normalcy is good news, but the effects of a 30-year imbalance 
will not be quickly erased.   
 One obvious impact of this gender imbalance is the lack of marriageable women.  The 
shortage of women, combined with educational and economic opportunities in the cities, leaves 
women with little incentive to settle for marriage to a poor farmer.  Rural and urban women alike 
could afford to be picky and still expect to marry.  However, this left the least desirable men with 
few options.  Koreans traditionally viewed marriage as the marker of adulthood.  Unmarried 
people regardless of age are called “boy” or “girl,” and the marriage ceremony itself is often 
granted transformative power in the maturation process.  To remain unmarried in South Korea 
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has traditionally carried a very negative social stigma.  As late as 1980, “eighty-four out of every 
eighty-five women in their thirties would have been married” (Kendall 1996, 4).  This new 
plague of bachelor farmers became much more visible in South Korea during the 1980s and 90s, 
with protest suicides by bachelors drawing attention to the issue (Kendall 1996).   
At roughly the same time, in 1992, South Korea and China normalized diplomatic 
relations.  This renewed awareness in South Korea of co-ethnic peoples outside of the Korean 
peninsula.  The Korean Chinese especially, having retained their strong Korean identity, 
appeared compatible with South Korean wifely ideals.  In December 1990, a small organization 
called the Overseas Korean Institute run by a political science professor and former National 
Assembly member made the first match between a rural South Korean man and a Korean 
Chinese woman from Yanbian (Chosun Ilbo 1990).  This event was much publicized in the 
South Korean national media.  As a result, local governments and agricultural associations in 
rural districts of South Korea began arranging and subsidizing “marriage tours” in which South 
Korean farmers traveled to China to meet and marry ethnic Korean women there (Kendall 1996, 
5).   
 
4.2  Marriage migration in theory and practice 
 Marriage migration was at that time a very unusual practice in South Korea.  Most South 
Koreans through the 1970s had married within their provincial boundaries, and rarely more than 
one province away (Kendall 1996).  Outside of Korea though, marriage migration is a fairly 
common practice. Marriage migration refers to the long-distance (usually transnational) 
relocation of a person for the primary and explicit purpose of marrying at the destination.  
Marriage patterns that fit this definition are practiced throughout the world.  While either sex 
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could theoretically be a marriage migrant, women form the overwhelming majority (Constable 
2005a, 4).  The physical means through which these marriages are arranged and concluded 
stretch from traditional to cutting edge, and from the freely chosen to the coercive.   Outcomes 
equally reflect the diversity of human relationships.  And yet marriage migration does occur 
across various and sundry places, indicating its durability as a means of structuring kinship 
relations.  Family and household formation, socially-acceptable sexual activity and reproduction, 
the division of unpaid labor in the home, inheritance systems and legal privileges are often 
predicated on marriage-based kinship.  Thus humans have very real material incentives to marry, 
and often face severe social and economic stresses if they do not.   
However, for a variety of reasons, people may seek a spouse outside of their local 
community.  Often, and especially true of the Korean case discussed here, failure to marry 
reflects some disadvantaging factor in the marriage market.  For men, this is associated with an 
inability to perform the traditional breadwinner role, such as personal disability, low levels of 
education, or poverty.  For women, economic factors such as dowries may be at play, but 
personal histories such as previous marriages could also impinge on local marital options.  
Another perceived benefit to marriage migration, also relevant to the Korean Chinese experience, 
is the preservation of particular cultural traits.  Long-distance marriages often take place within 
geographically dispersed cultural, ethnic, or religious groups.  The desire to maintain traditional 
values through marrying a “traditional” woman is expressed by otherwise very diverse 
populations.  Delia Davin (2008) relates how within China, “village” girls are considered the best 
brides in urban areas because of geographically-based assumptions about purity and the ability to 
properly reproduce a household.  Similar assumptions motivated the South Koreans in explicitly 
seeking out ethnic Korean women as brides. 
80 
 
 
Marriage migration is thus a complicated set of decisions and processes.  This complexity 
is further revealed by a brief review of scholarly attention to the issue.  Anna Cottrell (1990) 
chronicles the development of academic interest up to that time.  Initial interest in marriage 
migration began after the Second World War in light of rising numbers of “war brides.”  This 
trend continued with American involvement in the Korean and later Vietnam wars, and was 
compounded by the similar phenomenon of “colonial brides” resulting from long-term military 
occupation.  These marriages typically occurred between American servicemen and Asian 
women.  Most studies reported that the men involved were “alienated, loners, insecure, 
dependent, and disproportionately from families split by divorce, separation, or death” who were 
therefore “threatened by the strength and independence of American women and consequently to 
idealize Asian women as supportive and subservient” (Cottrell 1990, 154).  These marriages 
were characterized as isolating and essentially anti-social, with high rates of failure.  Cottrell 
emphasizes the inadequacies of this research, pushing for recognition of the diversity of 
participants in marriage migration, both within and beyond the “war bride” paradigm.   
 Perhaps heeding this call, Glodava and Onizuka (1994) provide a damning overview of 
more recent developments in marriage migration.  In their presentation, poor women from the 
global South are deceived into thinking that marrying a rich man in the developed world will 
solve their problems, then essentially sold into sexual slavery.  This analysis does consider a 
broader range of participants, including especially Eastern European women left destitute in the 
wake of the collapse of the Soviet bloc, yet it does little to theorize either the women or men 
involved.  Kojima (2001) works to further broaden discussions of marriage migration, both 
geographically and theoretically.  Examining the rapidly growing popularity of mail-order brides 
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in Japan, Kojima suggests that “the MOB system may be considered a subsystem within the 
patriarchal order that provides substitutes to maintain the sexual division of labor” (200).  Here, 
then, women in more developed countries are failing to meet market demand for domestic and 
reproductive services, and women from poorer nations are a substitute for this market failure.  
This view necessarily ties the functioning of capitalist systems to patriarchal systems, very much 
in keeping with Carol Pateman‟s influential argument in The Sexual Contract (1988).  Women 
are invariably disadvantaged participants in social and economic negotiations, if they are really 
participants at all.  
 However, this treatment of marriage migration has been widely refuted since the early 
2000s.  Simons (2001) describes the initial shift away from market-based explanations as a 
recognition of the diverse reality.  Early work, which focused on the “twin concerns of 
immigration fraud and exploitation of women” (5), treated women as either direct victims of 
trafficking or indirect victims driven by poverty to sell themselves on capitalist markets.  Simons 
especially critiques Glodava‟s work, which was based primarily on media reports rather than 
fieldwork or interviews. The agency of women was discounted, as by Pateman, as structurally 
compromised beyond redemption.  This is supported largely by reports of domestic violence, 
gold-digging wives, and general social deviancy on the part of all involved (Simons 2001, 29).  
Yet increasing numbers of academic studies throughout the 1990s, based on interviews with 
geographically diverse groups of marriage migrant wives and their husbands, seems to point in 
other directions.  Instead, the decision to marry out of one‟s natal community or country appears 
to very often reflect an assertion of will on the part of the women.  In place of a simple supply-
and-demand framework, Robinson (2007) argues “there is a need to understand these marriages 
as an aspect of the new ways in which personal relationships are being renegotiated in social 
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space constituted on a global level and facilitated by the global reach of capitalism” (484).  
Invoking Doreen Massey‟s 1994 argument for new “power geometries,” more recent work has 
granted women status as decision-making subjects in their own lives. 
 Indeed, the agency of female marriage migrants has been a persistent theme in the 
literature since 2000.  Robinson (2007) suggests that through advertising with marriage brokers, 
women “actively seek their own disposition as brides […] to realize their own dreams and 
ambitions” (486).  Constable (2005b) chronicles the experiences of two marriage migrants 
seeking greater equality in marriage than their homelands (China and the Philippines) could offer 
them.  These women initiated their matchmaking processes by choosing to advertise, then vetting 
their respondents based on their personal preferences, finally agreeing to meet only those men 
whom they deemed acceptable.  Even after personal meetings, in which men traveled to meet 
them, they had the choice to end the relationship at any time.  Gallo (2008) provides a 
fascinating study of Malayali Indian women who migrate to Italy.  Coming from families too 
poor to afford proper dowries, they had little hope for advantageous marriages at home.  
Rejecting their other options, including marrying similarly poor men or remaining unmarried 
within their natal families, these women chose to leave for Rome with the intention of becoming 
nuns.  Upon arriving in Italy, they discovered a range of opportunities previously unavailable to 
them; many obtained professional training and married local Italian men.  Alternately though, it 
is of equal importance to note studies like Blanchet (2008) who describes the tragic 
circumstances of Bangladeshi girls whose families, also too poor to afford dowries, instead sold 
them into abusive and exploitative “marriages” to elderly Indian men.  These studies reflect the 
wild variation in degrees of women‟s agency.   
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 Looking specifically at marriage migration within East Asia, recurring themes quickly 
become apparent.  Geographically unequal economies feature prominently (Bossen 2007, Davin 
2007), as does government policy in controlling marriage migrants (Sargeson 2006) and racism 
experienced by (particularly Southeast Asian) marriage migrants (Suzuki 2008, Tsay 2004).  Yet 
little work has examined the larger histories of sending and receiving areas, focusing instead on 
individual experiences.  Ignoring the broader social, historical, and cultural context risks 
naturalizing the flow patterns of marriage migrants.  Individual acts of marriage migration must 
occur within a larger enabling framework and result from long histories developed in and 
between these places.  The complex relationship between the Korean Chinese and South Korean 
areas and people testifies to this.  Marriage migration between Korean Chinese women and 
South Korean men emerged from Japanese colonialism, Cold War tensions, Chinese efforts 
towards a multinational state, diplomatic fluctuation between China and South Korea, as well as 
uneven development.  The divergent effects of these events on sending and receiving areas are 
revealed through the ensuing human experience of transnational marriage.   
 
4.3  Korean Chinese marriage migration: Rise of an industry 
 Marriage migration in South Korea, similar to labor migration, took as its starting 
assumption the desirability of ethnic homogeneity.  With local governments providing the early 
impetus and funding for marriage tours, the practice was soon expanded into a private industry.  
The Korean Chinese were initially sought out as the most desirable foreign spouses, because of 
the perceived ethnic purity of the Korean Chinese and their retention of Korean cultural 
traditions and language.  This understanding was encouraged by South Korean awareness of 
Chinese minority policy, allowing South Koreans to approach the Korean Chinese as a 
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population apart from the rest of China.  The existence of a specifically Korean political region 
within China also contributed to South Korean belief in the uncontaminated and pure Koreanness 
of the Korean Chinese.  South Koreans thus widely assumed that the ethnic Korean Chinese 
could integrate seamlessly into South Korean society.  Similarly, the Korean Chinese often 
viewed South Korea as an ethnic homeland, where they would be received as ethnic equals and 
would have the same economic opportunities and standard of living as South Korean citizens.  
These ideas were facilitated by the South Korean government‟s public relations campaign 
leading up to the 1988 Seoul Olympics and their later lobbying attempts to get the World Cup 
(Seoul and Tokyo were jointly selected in 1996).  These campaigns promoted South Korea as a 
thriving democracy that was embracing globalization.  Thus marriage migration was approached 
by both populations as beneficial and fairly unproblematic.  
 However, as reality has shown, the Korean Chinese and the South Koreans had 
formulated mismatched expectations for marriage migration.  The Korean Chinese women 
expected to marry into a highly developed society, where they and their children would have 
greater opportunities and a higher standard of living than they could expect in China.  In reality, 
those South Korean men who sought wives abroad were those who had essentially failed in the 
highly competitive domestic marriage market.  This was often because of marked poverty, lack 
of education, or social stigmas like physical or mental disability (Abelmann and Kim 2005, 109).  
Thus the Korean Chinese women often found themselves married into poor rural families where 
they were expected to shoulder a heavy burden of agricultural labor and produce children who 
would eventually do the same. 
 The South Korean men, by comparison, viewed the Korean Chinese as an economically 
disadvantaged group who should be grateful for the opportunity to leave China, regardless of 
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their new circumstances.  This is another manifestation of the hierarchical nationhood discussed 
by Seol and Skrentny (2009) and experienced by Korean Chinese labor migrants.  It further 
reflects South Koreans‟ geographic understanding of the hierarchy of world states.  Obviously 
both South Korea and China have geographically uneven internal economic development; within 
China, economic production is concentrated on the east and southeastern coast, while South 
Korea‟s wealth is overwhelmingly located in Seoul.  Despite this, South Koreans imagine all of 
South Korea to be a highly developed and well-off nation, and China by contrast is uniformly 
poor within its boundaries due to its lower GDP.  Following this logic, anyone leaving China for 
South Korea is moving up socially and economically. Thus it surprises some South Koreans 
when the Korean Chinese women are not satisfied with marriage to even a locally undesirable 
South Korean man.   
 As a result of these mismatched expectations, “these marriages [between Korean Chinese 
women and South Korean men] have been fraught with considerable marriage fraud and 
domestic violence, high divorce rates, and cultural tension” (Abelmann and Kim 2005, 110).  
Statistics for 2007 show that roughly 13% of international marriages involving South Korean 
men ended in divorce within the year (Chosun Ilbo 2007).  This rate increased to 16% by 2009 
(Hankyoreh 2009); for comparison, South Korea‟s overall divorce rate in 2007 was 2.5% (UN 
2008).  Specific reasons for divorce vary, but tend to relate to differing expectations of gender 
roles within the marriage.  Korean Chinese women, having experienced sixty years of 
communist „reeducation‟ on gender equity, in fact expect far greater participation by men in 
household labor.  South Korean men, by contrast, retain very traditional expectations of gendered 
divisions of labor.  When those expectations are disappointed (typically by the woman failing to 
meet the man‟s definition of a proper wife, or by the man imposing perceived unfair restrictions 
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on the woman), the result tends to be either physical abuse by the man or “disappearance” by the 
woman.   
 This has resulted in a two-pronged portrayal of these failed marriages in the South 
Korean press.  Either the women are described as victims of abusive and uneducated rural men 
(Pak 2007) or as manipulative visa-seekers who never intended to remain married (Choe 2003).  
These perceptions continue today; in 2010 an official at the governmental statistics bureau 
implied that Korean Chinese women were gaining citizenship through marriage, then divorcing 
their South Korean husbands and using their own naturalized South Korean citizenship to bring 
Korean Chinese men over through marriage migration (“we have data showing that about 500 
Korean women who married Chinese men last year are actually former Chinese citizens who 
were naturalized by marriage to Korean citizens” (Jung 2010)).  Despite these pronouncements, 
Korean Chinese women remain the largest source of foreign brides for South Koreans. 
 
4.4  State regulation of the body politic 
 While marriage is typically a private affair, governments do regulate and legislate the 
terms of these arrangements.  This is especially true with international marriages, when 
citizenship and attached benefits are at stake.  The South Korean government then has played a 
pivotal role in shaping the marriage migration of Korean Chinese women.  The development of 
an international marriage migration policy has closely paralleled the development of 
international labor migration policy, with early patchwork laws revised into harsh legislation in 
1997, and relaxed again between 2003 and 2006 due to human rights violations.  This evolution, 
as with labor immigration, has generally occurred as a reaction and response to popular 
discourses of nationhood negotiated between the Korean Chinese and South Koreans.  And again 
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similar to Korean Chinese labor migration, it has culminated in an understanding of the Korean 
Chinese as a group external to the Korean nation, one of several minority ethnic groups within 
the (South) Korean nation-state. 
 As mentioned, the first documented case of a Korean Chinese-South Korean marriage 
was arranged by a former member of the South Korean National Assembly, and widely 
publicized in the South Korean press (Chosun Ilbo 1990).  This inspired several local 
governments in agricultural areas to finance marriage migration tour to Korean areas of China 
(H.K. Lee 2008, 111).  Hence the state‟s role in marriage migration was both vital and visible 
from the beginning.  In the early years, up until 1996, the South Korean government had no 
specific procedure for dealing with international marriages and so essentially left it an open-door 
policy.  Simultaneously though, Korean Chinese labor migration was becoming a larger 
phenomenon.  As discussed in Chapter 3, this labor migration was regulated by small businesses 
rather than national legislation, and the number of Korean Chinese people hoping to seek work in 
South Korea far surpassed the number of small businesses willing or able to bring them over.  
 Marriage migration though was a much easier route into the country; it resulted in 
immediate and unconditional citizenship for the bride, and offered the additional perquisite of 
two “parent” visas intended to allow a bride‟s parents to visit her in South Korea.18  The lack of 
regulation left marriage migration open to abuses in the early 1990s.  Three types of marriage 
fraud resulted.  First, Korean Chinese women would legally marry South Korean men when 
neither party actually expected to enter into a real marriage.  This usually entailed some payment 
to the South Korean man, and resulted in a speedy divorce.  The second type of marriage fraud 
                                                 
18
 Early laws were extremely partiarchial as well, and reflected a government desire to limit marriage migration to 
incoming women; as Hye-Kyung Lee (2008, 112) reports, “female foreigners who married Korean men could obtain 
Korean citizenship immediately after their marriage, while male foreigners who married Korean women had to wait 
two years, and meet certain eligibility requirements in order to apply for nationality.” 
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was that of “runaway brides,” whereby a Korean Chinese woman would enter into a marriage 
with a South Korean man and then either disappear or file for divorce immediately upon receipt 
of citizenship, to the shock and horror of the new bridegroom (Freeman 2005, 93).  Finally, the 
“parent” visas were often used not by the parents but by friends or relatives in search of South 
Korean employment, or even sold.   
 The runaway bride phenomenon especially garnered much attention in the South Korean 
press.  Reports of heartbroken bachelor farmers who had invested their life savings in paying for 
a marriage tour played up popular images of cunning Chinese duping the honest Koreans 
(Freeman 2005).
19
  This eventually produced a legislative reaction, and between 1996 and 1997 
an extremely strict Nationality Law was passed in South Korea.  This required Korean Chinese 
women to prove first that they were unmarried, then register their new marriage with the Chinese 
government, then bring proof of marriage to South Korea to apply for a visa, then wait two years 
on a temporary visa before becoming eligible for citizenship (H.K. Lee 2008, endnote 4).  Such 
strict requirements were roundly criticized by human rights groups, and for good reason.  In fact 
many of the “runaway brides” were leaving abusive conditions.20  The new law essentially 
criminalized this, demanding immediate deportation of foreign brides who leave their marriage 
within two years with no exceptions.  Abused women had no recourse; this was especially 
atrocious in cases where the couple had children, in that the children remained the non-
negotiable property of the husband.  A non-citizen battered wife then had one legal option 
available to her, which was deportation back to her country of origin, leaving any children 
behind (H.K. Lee 2008, 113).  Further issues with the 1997 law include the barring of non-citizen 
                                                 
19
 For a humorous treatment of the issue, see Hwang Byung Guk‟s 2005 movie “The Wedding Campaign (나의 
결혼원정기).” 
20
 Domestic violence was and remains an unfortunately common practice in South Korea, especially in international 
marriages; see Ju-Min Park (2010). 
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foreign wives from working, from social security benefits, and from the state-run medical 
insurance program. 
 By 2003 though, public awareness of human rights abuses experienced by foreign labor 
and marriage migrants alike prompted the government to again revise the laws.  The new law, 
which did not go into effect until 2006, took a two-pronged approach to international migration.  
Addressing both labor and marriage migrants, it eased visa and entry requirements for both 
groups.  This had the immediate effect of decreasing the number of Korean Chinese women 
marrying South Korean men, while the number of labor migrants increased.  The new law also 
sought to address problems and discrimination faced by foreign brides.  Drastically expanding 
the South Korean governmental intervention into international marriages, it created a 
bureaucracy with seven explicit goals, worth quoting verbatim:   
“(1) regulation of international marriage agencies and protection of foreign wives before 
into into Korea; (2) support for victims of domestic violence; (3) support and orientation 
for newly arrived foreign wives, such as offering Korean language and culture classes; (4) 
support for children of international marriages in schools; (5) providing social welfare to 
foreign wives; (6) raising social awareness of multicultural issues; and (7) making a 
comprehensive support system to attain the goals”  
 (H.K. Lee 2008, 116, quoting the mission statement of the „Grand Plan‟ of the 
 Ministry of Gender Equality and Family). 
 
 This mission statement constitutes the first use of the phrase “multicultural” by the South 
Korean government.  It represents a sea-change in the South Korean government‟s approach to 
foreign marriage migrants, essentially abandoning the ideal of maintaining cultural and racial 
homogeneity (Lim 2010, 52).  It has since become a veritable buzzword in South Korea.  South 
Koreans hope that it will bring the South Korean state in line with international standards of 
equality.  But of vital importance to my discussion of the Korean Chinese is their inclusion in 
this category as „multicultural.‟  First of all, the word „multicultural‟ is now used in South 
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Korean media and government reports as a simple substitute for „ethnic.‟  Drawing again on 
Crossley‟s 2006 discussion of ethnic nationalism, „ethnic‟ and „multicultural‟ become politically-
correct ways for majority groups to say „minority.‟  That the Korean Chinese are now considered 
a „multicultural‟ element in South Korean society amounts to a legal recognition that they are not 
of the Korean (mono)culture.   
  
 The marriage migration of Korean Chinese women to South Korea raised issues similar 
to those of labor migration.  But the permanent and biological nature of marriage made it in some 
ways a more important target for state intervention.  Unlike labor migrants, marriage migrants 
were joining the South Korean genetic pool and thus tapping more deeply into ideas of descent-
based ethnic belonging.  The initial hope of the South Korean government was that the new 
additions would not alter the South Korean population‟s composite character.  This proved 
untenable.  Rather than allowing for a wider definition of the Korean nation though, this 
prompted the government to instead create a new category for understanding these semi-
foreigners.  Yet multiculturalism will not be the final solution for South Koreans; intermarriage 
will continue to produce a population that blurs the lines between the multiple cultures.  Lim 
(2010) reports that “in 2007, international marriages accounted for 40 percent of all marriages 
among men engaged in agriculture” (66, original emphasis).  How South Korea adapts to a 
native population with foreign blood will help shape its social and cultural future.  South 
Koreans have made clear though that Korean Chinese people are already part of that foreign 
element. 
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CHAPTER 5: 
Conclusions 
 
 Ethnic return migration is a strange phenomenon.  For ethnic return migration to occur, 
migrants require an initial impetus to leave, a draw in the receiving country, settlement, a 
secondary impetus to leave and favorable conditions for reception in the country of initial 
departure.  We can address it as a double migration, drawn out over several generations, because 
if the effects of the original out-migration from the ethnic homeland had died out completely 
then the subsequent „return‟ wouldn‟t be imagined as a return at all – it would be an arrival.  
Ethnic return migration hinges on this difference.   
 Most voluntary migration is undertaken hopefully, and in cases of ethnic return migration 
this is compounded by an optimistic expectation of reunion.  In almost every case though, this 
second expectation is disappointed.  Romantic ideals of long-lost kin and the warm embrace of 
the motherland give way to the blunt reality of hierarchically categorized difference.  For Korean 
Chinese, this is experienced on multiple fronts.  The legal process of entry into South Korean 
territory predesignates them as sub-South Korean, sub-Korean American, sub-Korean Japanese, 
and sub-North Korean (although higher than the Koreans of the post-Soviet states, a small 
consolation).  They are then barred from skilled employment and the public benefit system, 
permitted only to engage in low-wage production or unpaid reproduction.  Socially ostracized for 
linguistic differences and old-fashioned dress, Korean Chinese are constantly reminded that they 
are not full members of the Korean nation. 
 This sounds very bleak.  But the Korean Chinese go to South Korea willingly, and 
continue to do so today, when those romantic ideals are pretty well dispelled.  Certainly they are 
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influenced by global economic inequality that perpetuates a massive wage disparity.  They hear 
the clear messages sent by government-sponsored lessons in remittances.  But they are making 
their own decisions, sometimes in concert with the state and sometimes in conflict.  Working in 
South Korea has real benefits for them personally; I was often told the saying “work for five 
years in South Korea, live for fifty years in China.”  This is ultimately the decision that Korean 
Chinese are making.  
 To conclude this thesis, I return to Jessop and Oosterlynck‟s 2008 discussion of cultural 
political economy.  They propose an evolutionary understanding of semiosis, in which new 
meanings and practices arise continuously, but only some are selected and fewer still are retained.  
Such an approach allows for wide degrees of variation without chalking up the results to mere 
chance.  The Korean Chinese population has been imagined in the global economy in various 
ways – as sources of remittances, as cheap manual labor, as docile domestic reproducers.  Not all 
of these imaginings have held.  The Korean Chinese in the last sixty-plus years have themselves 
evolved an understanding of Korean identity that includes elements forgotten, denied, or altered 
by the South Korean population, while adding elements found beneficial to their own situation.  
The South Koreans too have changed, incorporating and innovating new approaches to their 
group identity.  The resulting identities are different.  This reflects different narrators‟ different 
degrees of success, indicative of unequal power structures and access to audiences.   
 The Chinese state has proven a powerful narrator, propagating discourses that 
“correspond to (or successfully shape) underlying material transformations, can mobilize 
different elites to form a new power bloc, can organize popular support, disorganize opposition, 
and marginalize resistance” (Jessop and Oosterlynck 2008, 1160).  Its discourse of a multi-
national China, whose component nationalities belong necessarily within the territorial bounds of 
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the Chinese state, seems now to be accepted by both the Korean Chinese and the South Koreans.  
But as I have argued, this did not occur by simple Chinese state imposition and Korean 
acceptance.  Particular aspects of state discourse are challenged and rejected.  States must 
negotiate with other interests, and they sometimes fail, as the ongoing modification of South 
Korean immigration law reveals.  In this instance, Chinese state discourse was enabled by other 
issues, including cultural divergence and unrealistic expectations of a shared ethnic background.  
This confluence of cultural, political, and economic factors gave rise to the ensuing experience of 
Korean Chinese ethnic return migration. 
 Returning then to my two framing questions, I have few answers to offer.  People 
understand and enact conflicting personal identities through negotiation and compromise.  Some 
nights they eat rice and some nights they eat rice noodles.  The state apparatus affects this by 
legislating who can go where, what jobs they can perform, whether they can get a divorce or not.  
But the state cannot legislate the nation; rather people work this out for themselves.  The Korean 
Chinese approached ethnic return migration from an understanding contrary to the wishes of the 
Chinese state, seeing themselves as constituent members of the global Korean nation.  After 
twenty years of negotiation, they now oppose the wishes of the South Korean state, which would 
apparently like to retain them as second-string co-nationals.  The new understandings of Korean 
Chinese identity are perhaps closer to the Chinese state ideal than before, but I see no evidence 
of a conclusive settlement.  Instead, the failure of the Korean Chinese to dissolve into their 
imagined ethnic homeland indicates new possibilities for the future. 
 Firstly, the inclusion of the Korean Chinese in South Korea‟s new (minority) category of 
multicultural does not signify their exclusion from the South Korean state.  It may push the 
Korean Chinese closer to other foreign groups in South Korea, but I believe even this distinction 
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– between Korean and foreign – is weakening and will continue to decline.  The impacts of 
South Korea‟s sex-ratio imbalance have not been fully realized, and the number of new foreign 
brides has grown every year since 1990.  The Korean Chinese continue to be the largest source 
of these brides, but as a percentage they are losing ground to Han Chinese and Southeast Asians.  
Blood-based understandings of the Korean nation will of necessity adapt.  As a geographer, I 
look forward to a more place-based approach.  I do not think that adaption will be an easy or 
smooth process.  The South Korean government is already struggling to offer Korean language 
and culture classes to foreign brides, and many of these women choose not to partake.  
Discrimination against honhyol (mixed-blood) children is on the rise, and will be a serious issue 
that South Koreans will need to address.  South Korea‟s rapid aging also has implications for 
their demographic future; without creating a more liberal immigration policy, labor shortages 
will increase.  This might even prompt consideration of abandoning ethnicity-based preference, 
although such a drastic measure has not yet been proposed.   
 Another issue related to the Korean Chinese experience in South Korea is that of the 
talkbukja, North Koreans in South Korea.  I have not addressed this here; firstly because it 
deserves a far more complex discussion than I can merit it, but secondly because there is so little 
data available.  The number of North Koreans in South Korea has been negligible – under 10,000 
– until very recently.  Their reception has generally been warmer than the Korean Chinese‟, with 
special welfare policies, employment assistance, and remedial education offered in an attempt to 
incorporate them into South Korean society (Chosun Ilbo 2010b).  Ironically though, North 
Koreans have fared much worse than the Korean Chinese, with high unemployment rates and 
reportedly extreme social isolation.
21
  But North Koreans in South Korea show strikingly similar 
                                                 
21
 Unlike the Korean Chinese and other foreigners in South Korea, North Koreans remain under government 
supervision for several years after arrival; they have not formed ethnic enclave communities, and seem to have an 
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disappointment with the weakness of the ethnic bond; as one teacher at a South Korean school 
for North Koreans stated, “[t]hat whole „Korean brotherhood‟ talk is a feel-good display by both 
governments… it really doesn‟t extend to North Korean refugees who make it to the South” 
(Rusling 2007).  Given that the number of North Koreans in South Korea has more than doubled 
in the last five years, hitting 20,000 in October 2010, South Korea may soon need to reconsider 
what co-ethnicity warrants.  Unlike the Korean Chinese, whose foreignness can be attributed to 
the corrupting influence of Chinese space, the North Koreans have a fairly strong claim to ethnic 
purity.  This will offer another challenge to South Korean concepts of ethnic nationhood.   
 The Korean Chinese will undoubtedly play a role in future negotiations of Korean 
identity.  But it seems unlikely that these negotiations will continue as they have proceeded in 
the past.  The initial post-division re-encounter between the Korean Chinese and the South 
Koreans was conditioned by global economic and political structures that have since changed 
dramatically.  In particular, China‟s advance as a world power will likely to raise the status of the 
Korean Chinese in relation to the South Koreans.  Opportunities for Korean Chinese in Chinese 
cities are increasing; the percentage of Korean Chinese in the northeastern China and Yanbian is 
decreasing with Han immigration.   
 The redefinition of Korean Chinese ethnicity, and its reorientation towards China, also 
suggests a greater role for the Korean Chinese within the Chinese state.  As discussed in Chapter 
2, Korean Chinese historians are already beginning to challenge dominant narratives in order to 
secure a more prominent role in Chinese history.  The surfacing of the Minsaengdan massacre 
implies an emergent willingness to dispute the Han Chinese, where previously the Korean 
minority demonstrated a subservient gratitude (M.D.P. Lee 2005).  We could perhaps draw an 
                                                                                                                                                             
especially hard time adapting to South Korea‟s very competitive form of free market capitalism.  See “N. Korean 
defectors bewildered by the South,” Washington Post, April 12, 2009; http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/04/11/AR2009041100766. 
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early comparison to Kaup‟s discussion of the Zhuang (2000), who, after accepting their Han-
given minzu category, eventually came to defend it against perceived Han oppression.  No longer 
thinking of themselves as a recently arrived immigrant group in China, the Korean Chinese have 
reconceived their position inside Chinese space and are beginning to demand their expected due.   
 Also important for consideration is the future of the Yanbian Korean Autonomous 
Prefecture and the ethnic Korean population throughout northeast China.  Changes experienced 
there were discussed in Chapter 3, but the long-term impacts are unknown.  Even if migration to 
South Korea stopped today, the Yanbian population will have to deal with a gender imbalance of 
their own.  Will they too begin to import brides?  Will the infrastructure development plan of the 
central state succeed in invigorating the Northeast?  The growth of Koreatowns in coastal 
Chinese cities offers another possibility for the Korean Chinese.  But since their minority 
privileges remain tied to their hukou registration, the opportunity costs of internal migration are 
higher than for Han Chinese.  I find these imminent demographic, cultural, economic and 
political choices of the Korean Chinese to be the most compelling in terms of future research, 
and hope to direct later efforts there.   
 The Korean people were a geographically concentrated group until the twentieth century.  
Not needing to consider the spatial aspect of their group membership, the Korean identity was 
instead understood biologically and culturally.  The rise of new borders and global dispersion 
through the twentieth century divided the population for the first time, but did not dispel the 
belief in a cohesive Korean nation.  Ironically it has been the process of reconnecting that 
challenges this.  All culture is constantly shifting and changing, incorporating new ideas and 
technologies; thus a fixed definition of Korean culture does not exist.  Instead Korean culture has 
been defined geographically, as the unique practices of the people in Korean space.  This 
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territorial understanding of nationality has been actively promoted by the Chinese state, 
eventually recognized by South Korea, and now accepted by the Korean Chinese themselves.  
The Korean Chinese have existed outside of Korean space too long to qualify for membership in 
the Korean ethnic nation. 
 Min-Dong Paul Lee (2005, 112) presents the following lyrics from Korean Chinese 
singer Cui Jian: 
I ask the heaven and the earth, “how much more must I travel?” 
I beseech the wind and the rain, “please, go far away from me!” 
Many mountains and many rivers, I can’t even distinguish east from west. 
Many people and many mouths, no one clearly speaks the truth. 
How should I say and how should I act to truly become myself? 
How should I sing and how should I chant to finally feel satisfaction? …. 
  - “Rock and Roll on the New Road to Long March” 
 
Cui Jian asks, “How should I say and how should I act to truly become myself?”  This is not a 
hypothetical question for the Korean Chinese today; it is a real and pressing issue that they are 
actively seeking to resolve. 
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